May 29, 2024 - No. 22


In This Issue 

: MAXimum Fallout: How the Last Generation of Boeing 737 will Lead to a New Era of Aircraft Development - Fastest – Growing Aviation Marketplace (locatory.com) 

: AFSOC Put 15 CV-22 Ospreys in Storage to Increase Mission Readiness for Rest of Flee 

: Falcon’s Pearl 10X Engine Reaches New Heights On 747 Flying Testbed 

: Congress directs FAA to revisit crash-resistant fuel systems in helicopters 

: The Air Force doesn’t know why maintenance mishaps spiked in 2023

: Shanahan: Spirit AeroSystems and Airbus need to have “family meeting”

: KC-46 Deliveries Paused Due To Boom Issue, USAF Says

: Cessna SkyCourier passenger and cargo combi option receives FAA approval

: Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How The F-35 Hollowed Out The U.S. Air Force – interview with author Bill Sweetman

: Airbus Will Hire More Engineers 

 

 


MAXimum Fallout: How the Last Generation of Boeing 737 will Lead to a New Era of Aircraft Development
2024-05-16

The Boeing 737. A workhorse of the skies, a symbol of commercial aviation progress for over half a century. Yet, the 737 MAX, the latest iteration of this iconic aircraft, became a tragic footnote in aviation history. While marketed as a fuel-efficient upgrade, the MAX’s grounding exposed a deeper issue – Boeing’s stubborn adherence to a decades-old design philosophy.

For years, whispers swirled within the industry. Airbus, Boeing’s arch-rival, had revolutionized the narrowbody market with their A320neo series, boasting superior fuel efficiency and longer range. Calls for a clean-sheet design, a true successor to the 737, echoed from analysts and airlines alike. But Boeing, seemingly content with incremental improvements, opted to stretch the capabilities of their aging platform.

This decision, driven by a desire to maintain production continuity and minimize development costs, would ultimately prove disastrous. The whole story of 737 MAX continuously tells of about the perils of clinging to the past. Let’s delve into the story, explore the technical shortcomings of the MAX, and analyze how Boeing’s development strategy contributed to a tragedy that could have been avoided.

A Culture of Speed? Questioning the Rush to Market
The 737 MAX was developed with a focus on efficiency and rapid production. Critics allege that this emphasis on speed may have compromised thorough testing and pilot training procedures. The MAX debacle has ignited discussions about prioritizing safety over aggressive timelines. Future aircraft development is likely to see a renewed focus on rigorous testing, with more emphasis on real-world pilot simulations and independent safety assessments before certification.

The Alaska Airlines incident, where a door plug on an unused emergency exit blew out during climb, exposed potential issues with the overall assembly quality of the MAX. This, coupled with the discovery of loose screws in the rudder control system reported in December 2023, paints a worrying picture. While Boeing reassures these are isolated incidents, the frequency of such problems raises questions about the rigor of the MAX’s post-grounding modifications and the effectiveness of quality control measures.

These recent developments come as Boeing attempts to restore public trust and rebuild the MAX’s reputation. The aircraft’s recertification in late 2020 was a step forward, but the Alaska Airlines incident and subsequent quality control concerns threaten to erode the progress made. Airlines, already facing a cautious public, might be hesitant to fully embrace the MAX until a clearer picture of its long-term reliability emerges.

And now, the company faces an uphill battle to convince passengers and airlines that the MAX is truly safe. Furthermore, the ongoing investigations into the Alaska Airlines incident and the broader quality control concerns could lead to further delays and grounded aircraft.

Rebuilding Trust with the Public
The MAX crisis eroded public trust in Boeing and the broader aviation industry. And rebuilding that trust will necessitate a commitment to transparency.

In a desperate attempt to regain control of the narrative and reassure a skeptical public, Boeing has announced significant leadership changes. The departure of CEO Dave Calhoun and the immediate retirement of Stan Deal, head of the commercial planes division, signal a desire for a fresh start. Additionally, the company is highlighting efforts to bolster its safety culture, including the appointment of new directors with expertise in engineering and safety.

However, these actions are met with a dose of skepticism. Critics question whether these changes represent a genuine commitment to safety or simply a public relations exercise. They argue that a true cultural shift requires more than just personnel changes; it demands a fundamental reevaluation of priorities and a relentless focus on safety at every stage of the manufacturing process. Yet, one thing is obvious as of today: manufacturers may need to adopt a more open approach to sharing data and collaborating with regulators throughout the development process. Airlines will likely face pressure to improve passenger communication regarding the age and technical specifications of their fleets.

The Rise of Automation: Will More Tech Mean Less Risk?
In the wake of the first MAX grounding, a profound introspection has gripped the aviation industry, beckoning a reevaluation of the symbiotic relationship between human pilots and automated systems. The tragic accidents underscored the complex interplay between technological advancement and human intervention, prompting soul-searching inquiries into the very essence of flight safety.

The MAX debacle wasn’t purely a result of automation’s shortcomings. Rather we could call it a poignant reminder of the balance required in harnessing technological prowess while honoring the indispensable role of human judgment. It’s a narrative that traverses the corridors of innovation and tradition, stirring debates about the extent to which automation should permeate the cockpit.

Yet amidst all the turmoil, a glimmer of enlightenment can be seen—and it’s some kind of realization that the future of aviation hinges not on a wholesale abandonment of automation but on its judicious integration. The discourse pivots towards a more nuanced paradigm, one where automation is not cast as a usurper of human agency but as a faithful ally, augmenting rather than supplanting pilot expertise.

This evolution heralds a shift towards the cultivation of automation systems that resonate with human intuition, eschewing the sterile confines of pure technological efficiency for a more holistic embrace of human-machine symbiosis. It’s a quest for automation systems endowed with failsafe mechanisms and intuitive interfaces, fostering a seamless fusion of human insight and technological precision.

Concomitant with this pursuit is a renaissance in pilot training—an acknowledgment of the importance of nurturing a cadre of aviators equipped not only with technical proficiency but also with the discernment and adaptability necessary to navigate the complexities of automated flight systems.

In this unfolding narrative, the rise of automation heralds not a diminution of risk but rather a recalibration—a rebalancing of the scales between technological advancement and human stewardship. It’s a journey fraught with challenges and uncertainties, yet imbued with the promise of a future where human ingenuity and technological innovation converge to chart new horizons in aviation safety.

A Shift in Focus: Prioritizing Passenger Safety Over Short-Term Gains
The story of 737 MAX is, of course, another reminder that safety must be the paramount concern in aerospace development. Airlines and manufacturers are likely to face increasing pressure from regulators and the public to prioritize safety over short-term economic gains. This could lead to a slower pace of development, with a greater emphasis on robust testing and pilot training.

Ever since global grounding of the MAX exposed potential shortcomings in the regulatory process were obvious. Moving forward, aviation authorities like the FAA and EASA are expected to adopt a more stringent approach to certification. This could involve stricter oversight of manufacturing processes, more demanding flight test protocols, and a deeper examination of potential software vulnerabilities. The mutual efforts of international regulators will be crucial in ensuring the highest safety standards for future aircraft.

The Fate of Older 737s: Increased Business, Higher Costs
With the MAX’s arrival pushed back, airlines are forced to re-evaluate their fleets. Originally planned retirements of older, less fuel-efficient 737 NG (Next Generation) models are being put on hold. These aging workhorses, while familiar to mechanics, are hungrier for fuel and generate higher emissions. This unexpected extension could lead to a surge in demand for parts and maintenance services for these older 737s.

For companies in the aviation aftermarket, this would mean a potential increase in business activities they perform. Repair stations and parts manufacturers could see a boost in activity as airlines keep their older 737s operational for a longer period. However, this surge in demand comes with a caveat – older aircraft are inherently more expensive to maintain. These planes require more frequent inspections, repairs, and potentially even component replacements due to wear and tear.

This translates to higher overall maintenance costs for airlines, potentially squeezing their already thin profit margins. And yet, there is another question looming: can the aftermarket adapt?

Of course, the market itself faces its own challenges in adapting to this unexpected scenario. The extended lifespan of older 737s necessitates a readily available supply of spare parts. Manufacturers and distributors will need to ensure sufficient stock to meet the increased demand, which could lead to temporary shortages or price hikes for certain parts. And the skillset required to maintain these older aircraft might become scarcer as younger mechanics are trained on newer technologies.

A Catalyst for Innovation?
This unforeseen situation could also act as some kind of catalyst for innovation within the sector. Companies might become more interested and extremely motivated in developing more efficient maintenance practices and extending the lifespans of critical components on older 737s. This could involve advancements in predictive maintenance technologies or the use of more cost-effective repair techniques.

The full impact of the 737 MAX delays on the aviation aftermarket remains to be seen. While it presents a potential business opportunity, it also poses logistical and financial challenges. The industry will need to adapt, innovate, and prioritize the safe and cost-effective operation of these aging aircraft until the MAX finally will be able to conquer the skies. This situation should remind us of the interconnectedness of the aviation industry, where a single event can have far-reaching consequences for businesses across the entire ecosystem.

The 737 MAX story is a cautionary tale, but it also presents an opportunity for positive change. By prioritizing safety, fostering transparency, and adopting a more measured approach to development, the aerospace industry can emerge stronger and more committed to ensuring the safety of passengers and crew for generations to come. The MAX effect will likely be a long-lasting one, shaping not just the design and certification of future aircraft, but also the public’s perception of air travel and the relationship between manufacturers, regulators, and airlines.


 


 

 


AFSOC Put 15 CV-22 Ospreys in Storage to Increase Mission Readiness for Rest of Fleet
May 24, 2024 | By Greg Hadley

Air Force Special Operations Command has been rotating its CV-22 aircraft into “flyable storage” status at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., as it works to upgrade components in the movable nacelles, the engine housings and transmission lines that give the aircraft its unique tiltrotor capabilities. 

The work began in 2022 and will continue into 2026. 

The previously unreported program is part of a larger effort to improve mission availability for the Osprey, but it won’t be clear until late 2025 if the changes are making enough of a difference to restore the full fleet to operational squadrons.  

Rep. Ronny Jackson (R-Texas) raised the topic of CV-22 readiness during the House Armed Services Committee’s markup of the 2025 National Defense Authorization bill.  
“The committee is aware of the force structure proposals for the fleet of CV-22 Osprey aircraft that are being considered by the Department of the Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command,” Jackson wrote in language adopted by the committee. Today, he said, 15 of the 51 CV-22 Osprey aircraft in the Air Force inventory “are in flyable storage with the intent of returning to an operational squadron no earlier than fiscal year 2026.”  

An AFSOC spokeswoman confirmed that the aircraft were in storage in response to a query from Air & Space Forces Magazine. 

Flyable storage means the aircraft can be put back in the inventory if needed, but spreads the available operations and maintenance funds across fewer aircraft, enabling higher availability rates. The Air Force applied a similar strategy in recent years to the B-1B bomber fleet, retiring some of the bombers so it could focus sustainment funding on fewer aircraft. 

“Air Force Special Operations Command placed 15 CV-22s in Flyable Storage at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., in FY22 to better support modification lines for a number of aircraft improvements, most notably the Nacelle Improvement program designed to simplify maintenance actions and raise the fleet’s aircraft availability rate,” the spokeswoman said.  

AFSOC’S Nacelle Improvement Program began in September 2021, with the Air Force contracting Osprey maker Bell Textron to do the work. In 2022, then-Lt. Col. Jonathan Ball said in a video that “60 percent of the maintenance occurs in the nacelles. So what this allows us to do is really address and improve on those reliability and sustainment issues that we’ve seen and learned from over the last decade, but still have the same amazing capability moving forward.”  

About half the CV-22 fleet has received the upgrade so far.  

Safety issues have haunted the Osprey since early in its development. But advocates say the data does not support its reputation for safety incidents. The program has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years after a series of fatal crashes and two periods when AFSOC paused flight operations while investigating concerns related to the aircraft’s clutch system, in particular.  

In November, a CV-22 crashed off the coast of Japan, killing all eight Airmen on board. Investigators blamed the crash on an unspecified material failure. A military-wide V-22 grounding that was lifted in March, but the aircraft’s operations are still limited. 

“We are gaining better fidelity on the effectiveness of the nacelle improvements on fleet readiness,” the AFSOC spokeswoman said. “We believe we will have sufficient data by late 2025 to inform a decision whether to return the flyable storage aircraft to operational squadrons.”  

Jackson’s amendment to the House version of the Authorization bill says Congress is “aware of and very concerned by recent proposals to move multiple CV-22 Osprey aircraft to a long-term preservation site.”  

Asked if the Air Force has pending proposals or plans to change the Osprey’s force structure, the AFSOC spokeswoman responded: “There have been no further decisions on the CV-22 fleet status since those program changes in FY22.”  

However, an April force structure report issued by the Pentagon indicates the Air Force is seeking to retire two CV-22s in 2025. However, the report notes that “two CV-22s will be delivered immediately prior to two divesting.” The report shows no other planned CV-22 retirements through 2029.  

As part of the reporting language Jackson introduced into the NDAA, the Secretary of the Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command commander would have to provide a briefing to lawmakers by December 2024 including:  
•	A detailed force structure and preservation plan for the CV-22  
•	A review of any manpower shortfalls over the last three years  
•	The impact of the Nacelle Improvement program  
•	Investments needed for “safety, reliability, survivability, and capability”  
•	Analysis of “any recent changes to the maintenance protocols over the last three years” for the CV-22  
•	Any funding that has been diverted away from the CV-22  

Elsewhere in the House Armed Services Committee version of the NDAA, lawmakers authorized an extra $125 million for procuring V-22 safety enhancements. The additional funds still must be approved by the Senate and by appropriators in both chambers. 

 


 

 


Falcon’s Pearl 10X Engine Reaches New Heights On 747 Flying Testbed
Guy Norris 
May 23, 2024

Combined RB211 and Trent 1000 power boosts the Pearl 10X—mounted on the inboard right wing—to higher altitudes.
Credit: Rolls-Royce

Rolls-Royce’s highly unusual Boeing 747-200 flying testbed takes the “form follows function” design principle to a new height as part of the company’s efforts to wring out the performance of its Pearl 10X business jet engine.

Destined for Dassault’s Falcon 10X long-range flagship business jet, the Pearl 10X is mounted on a specially designed test pylon that projects forward from the inboard right wing. What makes the “Franken-testbed” so unusual is that it retains three of its four original Rolls RB211-524s and a single Trent 1000 TEN in the No. 2 engine inboard position on the left wing.
•	Trent 1000 provides extra thrust for altitude performance
•	Pearl 10X and Advance 2 exceed 2,500 test hours

The novel engine mix is driven primarily by the high-altitude test requirements of the Falcon 10X program, says Philipp Zeller, senior vice president of Rolls-Royce’s Dassault business aviation unit. Although the Trent 1000 TEN previously was tested on the 747 for upgrades related to the Boeing 787—the aircraft for which the engine was developed—the “Trent 1000 is part of the normal operation of the aircraft,” Zeller says. “It’s not used as a development vehicle, and the Pearl 10X is the only engine that is there for experimental reasons.

“You can imagine for a business jet engine that will be flown in excess of 50,000 ft., we want to test as high up as possible, and a 747-200 would not achieve anything close,” he continues. “So with the additional thrust of a Trent 1000, we are able to push the altitude a little bit further.” The standard RB211-524-powered 747-200 was certified for flight up to 45,100 ft., but the Trent will provide increased margin for greater altitudes and flight profile testing more representative of the business jet’s performance envelope.

The aircraft was modified by L3Harris in Waco, Texas, ferried to Rolls’ flight-test base in Tucson, Arizona, on March 29 and has conducted several high-altitude sorties. Engine tests were performed during the 4-hr. 27-min. transit mission from Texas, which included more than 1 hr. of flight at altitudes over 45,000 ft. On May 14, a flight test evaluated the engine at various altitudes between 15,000 and 43,000 ft. and speeds ranging from 190 kt. to around Mach 0.85.

Including the transit flight, the modified 747 had flown seven times as of May 20, Zeller says. “Three of these were out of Waco and were mostly focused on commissioning the aircraft after its service period and the rework of the pylon and the wing,” he explains. The test pylon attaches to the original structural hardpoint located inboard for ferrying engines and suspends the Pearl 10X ahead of the adjacent engine to avoid potential flow interaction effects.

“We have had four experimental flights, including the transfer flight, and we have a lot of good data already,” Zeller says. The flight-test program includes engine performance and handling checks at various speeds and altitudes, inflight relights, tests of the nacelle’s anti-icing system and fan vibration trials at various altitudes. “We’ve been very pleased with what we’ve seen so far,” he says. “The data we’re collecting fully validates our models of the performance at altitude. So far, it’s looking really good, and we’re getting the data that we want.”

Rated at over 18,000 lb. thrust—around the same as the Pearl 700 on the newly certified Gulfstream G700—the new Falcon engine also shares the Pearl 700’s Advance 2 demonstrator high-pressure (HP) core. Featuring a blisked titanium fan and a four-stage low-noise low-pressure turbine, the engine’s 10-stage, 24:1-pressure-ratio HP compressor incorporates six stages of titanium blisks, while the two-stage HP turbine is shroudless. Additive-layer-manufactured (ALM) tiles are incorporated into the engine’s low-emissions combustor.

The Pearl 10X is “pushing technology to the limit in terms of the levels of thrust we have to deliver together with emissions, noise and fuel flow requirements,” Zeller says. “It is really something I believe that nobody else can do. We have built this on the Advanced 2 core, which is the best there is, and we’ve equipped this further now with the new ALM combustor technology. That’s really allowed us to reach all of those goals.”

Zeller adds: “You can never take this for granted, and in engine development, you will only learn when you see the thing run. So now we’ve done that running—and at altitude—and we’re very pleased with how it’s come out.”

Dassault selected the Pearl 10X in 2021, and it made its first run early the following year. Together with tests of the Advance 2 core, Rolls-Royce has accumulated more than 2,500 hr. of run time on the configuration. The engine-maker has three ground-test and certification powerplants in the program and two flight-test units, both of which will be shipped to Dassault for use in Falcon 10X flight tests following evaluation on the 747.
Despite Dassault’s decision to delay service entry of the Falcon 10X to 2027 from 2025 amid supply chain issues and post-COVID-19 market recovery trends, Zeller says Rolls’ engine testing and development continue to follow the original schedule. “We have not artificially delayed the program on our side,” he notes. "Discussions with Dassault are more on integration activities that are aligned with them and when they get ready to build their flight-test aircraft. But on the engine side, I think we’re progressing quite well and in line with our plan,” he adds.


 


Congress directs FAA to revisit crash-resistant fuel systems in helicopters
By Elan Head | May 20, 2024

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration will be required to revisit the topic of crash-resistant fuel systems (CRFS) in helicopters under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 that was signed into law last week.

In the last FAA Reauthorization Act, passed in 2018, Congress mandated CRFS in all new-build helicopters operating in the U.S., a requirement that took effect on April 5, 2020. The rule followed extensive study of CRFS and other crash safety features by the Rotorcraft Occupant Protection Working Group (ROPWG), convened by the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), which published its recommendations in a final report in October 2018.

The CRFS mandate improved the safety of newly manufactured helicopters, but because it does not apply to aircraft built before April 2020, many older helicopters continue to fly in the U.S. without this important safety feature. As Vertical has previously reported, operators have been reluctant to spend money on CRFS retrofits, although Airbus Helicopters Inc. recently began offering retrofit kits free of charge to customers with AS350 B3, H125 (AS350 B3e), and EC130 B4 helicopters in the U.S.

The 2024 FAA Reauthorization Act directs the ARAC to review the ROPWG’s analysis and recommendations, and update its 2018 report using data on post-crash fires in helicopter accidents from 2016 through 2023. That time frame includes the February 2018 crash in the Grand Canyon of an EC130 B4 operated by Papillon Airways, which resulted in five fatalities that the National Transportation Safety Board linked to significant burn injuries from the immediate post-crash fire.

The Reauthorization Act states that the ARAC should determine “whether and to what extent crash-resistant fuel systems could have prevented fatalities in the accidents” and “develop recommendations for either the [FAA] or the helicopter industry to encourage helicopter owners and operators to expedite the installation of crash-resistant fuel systems in [their] aircraft . . . regardless of original certification and manufacture date.”

The act directs the ARAC to submit its recommendations within 18 months of being tasked with the project, and tells the FAA to begin acting on those recommendations within 180 days of receiving them. It also directs the FAA to partner with the U.S. 

Helicopter Safety Team to facilitate the implementation of any recommendations developed specifically for the helicopter industry.


 


The Air Force doesn’t know why maintenance mishaps spiked in 2023
By Courtney Mabeus-Brown

 Wednesday, May 22, 2024

Senior Airman Collin Johnson, 80th Fighter Generation Squadron aerospace propulsion journeyman, performs maintenance procedures on an F-16 Fighting Falcon during hot pit refueling at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, Jan. 17, 2023. (Senior Airman Karla Parra/Air Force)

The Air Force has been unable to pinpoint what caused last year’s costly spike in maintenance-related aircraft mishaps, according to the service’s top leaders.

In an interview with Air Force Times, Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin, the service’s highest-ranking officer, and Chief Master Sgt. of the Air Force David Flosi, its top enlisted leader, said that while attempts to find a particular culprit behind the accidents have not borne answers, the service is continuing to examine why mishaps jumped. The service is “doubling down” on managing risk at the unit level, Allvin said, while ensuring airmen’s training isn’t rushed — potentially endangering troops who misunderstand instructions or skip steps.

RELATED
Air Force’s costliest accidents, maintainer injuries rose in 2023Two people died and 10 aircraft were destroyed in aviation-related mishaps in FY23 as the Air Force’s most serious accidents hit a five-year high.By Courtney Mabeus-Brown

“We’re really hunting and pecking to see if there’s anything specific,“ Allvin said of maintenance-related accidents. “We have not found a specific cause. But it certainly has caught our attention.”

The Air Force’s most serious non-combat mishaps jumped to a five-year high in fiscal year 2023, while at the same time, accidents occurring during ground maintenance nearly doubled from from the previous year, Air Force Times previously reported. The incidents have cost the service millions of dollars and injured a growing number of maintainers as the Air Force’s stretched-thin maintenance corps juggles an aging aircraft fleet.

Among the most serious incidents, Stephanie Rodriguez-Cosme, a 32-year-old test engineer and contractor, died after she was struck by an MQ-9 Reaper drone′s whirring propeller during ground testing at Grey Butte Airfield, California, in September.

An Air Force investigation said Cosme was incorrectly trained on taking data readings with the drone’s engine running, and wasn’t paying close attention as she approached the aircraft. Investigators also cited a lack of clear communication between contractors and ground support personnel, and said they were rushed because of previous delays.

Aircraft engines, towing mishaps and wayward flashlights have also caused problems. In one case, a handheld flashlight caused about $4 million in damages to an F-35 assigned to the 56th Fighter Wing at Luke AFB, Arizona, after it was sucked into an engine during a ground run, an investigation revealed.

In two cases, maintainers encountered damage while installing engines in CV-22 Ospreys, including a winch cable that broke, damaging several components.
“Our older aircraft are finding new and interesting ways to break,” Allvin acknowledged.


 



Shanahan: Spirit AeroSystems and Airbus need to have “family meeting”
By the Leeham News Team

May 7, 2024, © Leeham News: 

For a company actively negotiating its own dismemberment, Spirit AeroSystems managed to record first quarter losses even worse than Wall Street expected. The company recorded $617M in losses and burned through $444M in cash during the first three months of the year due to the ongoing Boeing 737 MAX crisis and unfavorable prices on its Airbus A530 and A220 work.

“The death throes of Spirit are hard to watch, as these 1Q numbers are pretty horrendous,” Rob Stallard, Vertical Research aerospace analyst, wrote in a research note after the company released its earnings report.

It recorded $495M in net forward losses, largely from the Airbus A350 ($280M) and A220 ($167M) programs.

Spirit’s executives have been trying for months to renegotiate pricing on the two programs to stop the bleeding and free up capital to spend on increasing production rates for Airbus. Those investments need to start in the second half of the year, Pat Shanahan, president and CEO of Spirit, said during a conference call with investment analysts on Tuesday.

Shanahan said Spirit would not use strongarm tactics, such as not shipping finished components, in order to force Airbus to agree to new pricing. But he indicated that the two companies need to have frank conversations about what it will take for Spirit to keep up with the aerospace giant’s plans to increase A350 production rate from six jetliners per month now to nine/month in 2025 (and 12/month by 2028).

“With these production rates, we’re going to have some of those, you know, family meetings” with Airbus officials, Shanahan said.
No updates on acquisition talks

Spirit executives did not have any updates on acquisition talks with either Boeing or Airbus. Boeing is considering buying back the Wichita, Kansas-based supplier, minus its Airbus operations and possibly defense work that would conflict with current Boeing programs. In 2005, Boeing spun off Spirit, which assembles 737 fuselages and ships them by rail to Boeing’s Renton and Everett plants in Washington.

Many industry watchers talk about Spirit’s break up as if it is a foregone conclusion.
“The key sticking point in the timing of when Boeing and Spirit can announce a deal, in our view, is when Spirit might reach a deal to return its Airbus content to that customer,” JP Morgan aerospace investment analysts Seth Seifman wrote in a note published Tuesday morning. “Airbus is reportedly seeking compensation to take on this work and Spirit does not have the resources to provide it.”

Much of the work is done at Spirit’s plant in Belfast, Northern Ireland, where it assembles the A220 wings. The supplier bought the operation from Bombardier on its way out from the commercial jet industry. However, it is a money loser now. According to financial documents filed with the United Kingdom, the Belfast operation lost £134 million (about $168 million) in 2022, the most recent year available.

In addition to adding production equipment, Airbus has to hire and train more people to keep up with Airbus’s production rate ramp, Spirit CFO Mark Suchinski said during the earnings call. “We’re staffed to meet the current pace.”

Across the company, Spirit slashed its workforce by 34 percent during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of those who left were among its most experienced employees, Melius Research analyst Robert Spingarn wrote in a research note published in March.
Unlike most industry analysts, Spingarn is skeptical about the value of Boeing re-absorbing Spirit.

“A Boeing acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems makes little sense for anyone except Spirit’s shareholders,” he wrote in the March note. “A deal would be an optical and financial solution to an operational problem that will not be fixed by combining the two companies.”
Flailing for a financial lifeline

After a rougher-than-expected quarter, Spirit has $352 million in cash left. Its earnings announcement said that company executives have “developed plans to pursue various options to improve liquidity as needed and expects these plans will sufficiently improve the Company’s liquidity needs.”

While Spirit is close to checking beneath the couch cushions for loose change, it also holds almost $1.8 billion in inventory, mostly unshipped 737 MAX fuselages.
Boeing and Spirit recently overhauled quality inspection on the program, and Boeing is no longer taking fuselages with travelled work.

Shanahan said quality is improving and the supplier will start this month to work through its backlog of 737 fuselages.

Spirit plans to keep MAX production at 31/month through the end of the year even if Boeing increases its rate to 38/month. The supplier’s backlog inventory gives it a buffer, he said.

Spirit reported an adjusted loss per share of $3.93, which was far worse than analysts’ consensus estimate of -$0.59/share.
The supplier also booked a $34M loss on its 787 work and is expected to have another $50M to $60M in losses in the second quarter.

Shanahan: Spirit AeroSystems and Airbus need to have “family meeting”
 

KC-46 Deliveries Paused Due To Boom Issue, USAF Says
Brian Everstine 
May 23, 2024

A KC-46 takes off on a delivery flight from Boeing Field in Seattle in December 2023.
Credit: U.S. Air Force

The U.S. Air Force has not taken delivery of KC-46 tankers from Boeing in more than two months as a new issue on the aircraft’s boom was discovered during inspections.
Boeing to date has delivered 82 KC-46s to the Air Force, and four more to the Japan Air Self Defense Force. The service says in a statement that deliveries were briefly paused starting in March after a fleet inspection revealed a broken boom gimbal nut lockwire—the gimbal is a swivel joint providing boom movement in all three axes, with the nut securing the boom to the gimbal. The next delivery is expected by the end of the month, the service says.

“Deliveries were paused while production and fielded aircraft completed inspections to ensure continued safety of the fleet and receivers,” an Air Force spokesperson says. “The [Air Force] completed all aircraft inspections and resumed the aircraft acceptance process; two aircraft are undergoing final inspection stages and are expected to deliver by 31 May 24.”

Boeing, in a statement, says it is “working closely with the customer to mitigate any impact to the fleet and are committed to delivering the KC-46A with a focus on safety and quality.”
The latest pause follows two others in 2023, one related to a quality issue from supplier Daher and another that the Air Force attributed to red tape issues. Boeing ended 2023 delivering a total of 12 tankers to the Air Force, two less than the service’s expected 14, for a total of 80. Two have been delivered so far in 2024.


 


Cessna SkyCourier passenger and cargo combi option receives FAA approval
BY IAN MOLYNEAUX
2024-05-21

Textron Aviation

A new combi option for the Cessna SkyCourier has received approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States (US).  

The new combi interior conversion option allows for both passengers and cargo to be flown simultaneously, marking the Cessna SkyCourier as a truly versatile aircraft. 
Textron Aviation, which owns the Cessna brand, announced on May 20, 2024, that the new option will allow operators to transport nine passengers and cargo at the same time.  

Deliveries of the new aircraft configuration are expected to begin later this year. 
 “This newly certified combi kit adds to the growing list of options for the versatile Cessna SkyCourier,” said Lannie O’Bannion, Senior Vice President of Global Sales and Flight Operations at Textron. “The Combi will allow operators to use the aircraft for an even broader range of missions globally and quickly change configurations to best serve their needs.” 

Currently the Cessna SkyCourier twin-engine, high-wing turboprop is available in both freighter and passenger variant as well with a gravel kit option for maximum flexibility. 

Textron says its current customers of the SkyCourier include government agencies, law enforcement and militaries, corporations, and humanitarian organizations. 

The aircraft can be operated by a single pilot and can carry up to 19 passengers without cargo onboard while as a freighter the Cessna SkyCourier can transport up to three LD3 shipping containers with a 6,000 pounds of payload capability. 

The aircraft is powered by two wing-mounted Pratt & Whitney PT6A-65SC turboprop engines and features the McCauley Propeller C779 four-blade propeller. 

The SkyCourier has a 900 nautical-mile maximum range. 


 


Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How The F-35 Hollowed Out The U.S. Air Force – interview with author Bill Sweetman

Bill Sweetman believes something is very wrong with the F-35.

The F-35 used to have a largely negative public perception, but this seems to have changed with a media offensive in the 2010s, with many public interviews with test pilot Flynn and other pilots enthusing about the F-35’s capabilities for stealth and situational awareness – what do you make of this shift in perception?

Not sure I’d agree that there was a shift. Aside from myself and a few others (APA for instance) there were more enthusiasts, and they were louder. Although there was a change in propaganda around 2008 as LM got ready to ditch support for the F-22 and go all-in on F-35. I think that a lot of people who could have helped form opinions just gave up. It certainly wasn’t career-enhancing.

  What does the recent GAO report tell us about the health of the F-35 programme?
The most recent report is a shocker, even for me. It shows that the entire Block 4 upgrade plan has been found unrealistic. In early 2023, delivery of a combat-ready TR3 was expected in ~8 months. Now, more than a year later, it’s 18 months. They have done source selection for the upgraded engine (want to bet it won’t be a new engine by the time they’re done) without a requirement or a plan. Meteor? Spear 3? Don’t even ask.

Is the management of F-35 much worse than all other fighters? How is it compared to say the Typhoon, Rafale or Kaan?

No programme has been this late, or overrun by this much, when it has always been fully funded and the requirements have never been tightened, only relaxed. I go into detail in the book, but it has to do with the power of the mega-contractors that formed in the 1990s, the fact that the JPO doesn’t report to an operational user, and the absence of an alternative.

Typhoon had a lot of trouble, but a lot of it has been political, mostly British-German politics. Germany was ready to scrap it completely in the early 90s. Later, production and upgrade orders kept getting delayed because Germany was in an election year, the British Treasury was on the warpath, “why are you buying these relics when Our Boys need MRAPs?” and so on.

Much respect to the French. The end of the Cold War left the AdlA with a lot of quite new M2000s and the Aeronavale with museum-piece F-8s, so they built their fighter program around those data points, with M2000 upgrades and an F1/F2/F3 process that they had defined in the mid-90s and delivered on time.

I can’t say much about KAAAAAAAN! as William Shatner would call it.

What fighter would you choose to go to war in, and why?
I prefer to use them to deter war. Rafale has a vast range of capabilities available, may not be the best at everything, but is well balanced, has a solid upgrade program, and – I hate to say this is important, but it is – is very free from U.S. content. Gripen E is very close and less costly to operate (so I can field more of them), and may be better in some ways if that Mongo EW system does what it says on the tin.

I may be wrong, but I feel I recall the JSF being promised as an extremely low-cost easy-to-maintain Mach 2 fighter-bomber*, do I recall this correctly and is it?
It was always M=1.6. But yes, it was advertised as being cheap to maintain and reliable, it is absolutely neither of those things, and it is going to be hard to change that. Far too much faith was placed in automated diagnostics and prognostics, and by the time they admitted that Alis was a failure it was very late.

The reliance on touchscreen has been criticised by some, as losing the eyes-off feel of buttons and switches, what is your opinion?
I don’t have a strong view there. I think it’s something you have to be careful with, because you don’t know what works and what doesn’t until you fly it. I love the incredibly French detail with Rafale touchscreens, which is to give the pilots gloves with seamless fingertips and a chamois back to wipe any hand-prints off the screen. Oh, and I hate touchscreens in cars.

To what extent, if any, has the absence of exportable F-35s and air-to-ground optimised F-35s led to the profusion of non-US fighters currently in development?
Limited. The main factors, I believe, are the strings attached to the F-35, the lack of confidence in the U.S. as an ally, which given the polls is entirely justified, and arrogance. The Japanese MoD insisted on “right of modification” in the FX RFI and the U.S. side ignored it entirely because they absolutely could not conceive of the Japanese ditching them for the Brits.

You have been studying this project for a while, how has your judgement of it changed over time?
Initially, it looked amazing. But around 2008, it was clear that the schedules being published were unattainable, the claims became more fantastical, and the assaults on critics became ruthless. After that, the propaganda became repellent and was clearly hiding failure.

Is the aircraft itself bad or just the programme management?
There are three main things wrong with the aircraft: the features forced in by STOVL, which degrade performance; the centralized and non-partitioned avionics, which make changes and upgrades difficult; and inadequate cooling. There are also what I call “pet rocks” – technologies that made their way in without adequate assessment, like the no-HUD cockpit, electrohydraulic actuation, and the steampunk secondary power system.
Is the F-35 the most survivable modern fighter?

Hard to say without knowing how effective other fighters’ EW systems are. It’s also valid mission engineering to say of some threats, “well that’s why we have Storm Shadow or Taurus.”

Does price gouging happen with the F-35 suppliers? Additionally, are F-35B peculiar components fairly priced?
Most supply-chain issues involve primes leaning on suppliers’ throats and threatening to recompete. Then the suppliers can’t pay competitive salaries and their best performers go to the primes, while quality gets pared to 0.0001 higher than acceptable. The TR3 problem is rooted in a recompete. Pro-tip: if your original supplier walks away laughing it’s a sign that they think their replacement doesn’t understand the job. They’re most likely right.

What needs to happen?
Very hard to say. I’ve been warning since 2009-10 that the project was in bad shape. At one point I recommended putting the B and C on ice and focusing on fixing the F-35A. But between the programme’s difficulties and the changes in warfare – long-range combat aircraft launching unmanned things might be more important. We also need changes in the way we do acquisition and stop thinking of it as a competitive market, because it ain’t that anymore.

Some say the lower availability rates of the F-35 are offset by its superior potency, thoughts on this?
If the airplane was really as good, 1-v-1, as the fans say it is, the USAF would have stayed with the adaptive engine vs. revised F135.

Biggest myth?
That it’s cheaper than anything else. Typhoon beat it on procurement cost in Korea. In fact both Typhoon and Rafale are pretty close in real numbers. (Export sales to non-democracies often have bigged-up numbers because it benefits both sides.) And the operational costs are high, partly due to security.

What should I have asked you?
Why has it won all round on exports? I go into that in the new book, but the most basic point is that if you think it doesn’t matter where a nation shops for its largest military procurement, you’re being (to put it kindly) a little naïve at the best of times, and these are not the best of times.

You quoted someone in your first F-35 book about the JSF being the greatest threat to the EU, what did that mean and what do you think of that from a modern perspective? 
That was a Frenchman in 2003-04 when everyone expected the F-35 to work as advertised. I don’t think there is any doubt that the programme’s objective was to knock the Europeans out of the business and establish a monopoly – which ultimately would have made Europe entirely dependent on American defense technology in ways that would take decades to reverse.

The next generation of fighters seem to all have greater range, is low range a weakness of 5th gen? 
Cold War fighter ranges were measured against Central Europe. The “objective” range for the F-35A and F-35C in the Key Performance Parameters was influenced by Desert Storm, but the customers only got the threshold number. More range is good and worth trading max speed and max g for.

Bill’s new book Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How The F-35 Hollowed Out The U.S. Air Force is available to buy here.

*HK note: The design objectives for JSF were very broadly defined, in order to give maximum flexibility to designers. They eventually crystallized into something called ORD3. I think M 1.8 may have been desirable, but suspect 1.6 as essential. In the ASTOVL studies, only the RALS system might have given a Mach 2 capability but was a non-starter due to ground erosion, hot-gas ingestion, and (probably) other aspects as well. I think it must have been the M1.8 figure I recalled.


 


Airbus Will Hire More Engineers

by Rich Thomaselli

Last updated: 3:55 PM ET, Sat May 25, 2024

Although it might not admit it, Airbus is going for the kill.
As its main competitor in the airplane manufacturing business, Boeing, continues to struggle, Airbus said it will hire 400 more engineers.

The engineers are from Britain and will be assigned to the companies production facility in Wales. They will work on single-aisle airplanes. The Airbus plan is to increase output of the A320 airplane from 48 a month to 75 or more monthly by 2026. 

Jerome Blandin, Airbus’s head of global wing production, Indicated that more bodies are needed because the production plans will not be fully automated.

Scrutiny of Boeing has intensified in the last half-year, but the company has been struggling for a while. It has lost more than $30 billion over the last five years. The company has had to slow down its production and output and therefore has lost market share to Airbus. 

Airbus added more than 1,000 employees in Britain last year.

Airbus CEO Tom Enders said: “We will see a level of improvement and a better efficiency on the new production line in terms of how we put the product together.”
In an effort to increase production, Airbus has even utilized one plan for around the clock production with three shifts.

There has been no further comment from either airplane manufacturer.


 
Curt Lewis