Flight Safety Information - December 18, 2024   No. 251


In This Issue

: Scoot B789 at Singapore on Feb 5th 2024, landed on occupied runway

: LATAM A320 at Asuncion on Oct 27th 2022, storm damage, both engines flamed out, one engine relighted

: Ryanair B738 near Rome on Dec 15th 2024, electrical/navigation problems

: Investigators Uncover Violations in Helicopter Crash, Raise Concerns Over Regulatory Gaps in Nigerian Aviation

: India Express B738 at Kochi on Dec 17th 2024, tyre damage on departure

: New FAA rule requires U.S. agent for pilots with foreign addresses

: Gol B738 at Porto Alegre on Dec 15th 2024, flaps problem

: FAA Encouraging GA Safety Management Systems

: EU Bans Air Tanzania On Safety Grounds

: EU safety agency lifts ban on Pakistan national airline after four years

: Calendar of Events


 


 


Scoot B789 at Singapore on Feb 5th 2024, landed on occupied runway
By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 16:47Z, last updated Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 16:47Z

A Scoot Boeing 787-9, registration 9V-OJH performing flight TR-189 (dep Feb 4th) from Hangzhou (China) to Singapore (Singapore) with 354 people on board, was cleared to land on runway 02C and continued for a landing without further incident.

A Korean Airlines Boeing 787-9, registration HL7209 performing flight KE-647 from Seoul (South Korea) to Singapore (Singapore) with 106 people on board, had landed on runway 02C just prior to 9V-OJH and was vacating the runway via high speed turnoff T6. The aircraft was still not clear of the runway and beyond the hold short line when 9V-OJH crossed the runway threshold.

Singapore's AIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:

- The RWC’s (Runway Controller's) issuance of landing clearance to Aircraft B (9V-OJH) was in line with the ATSP’s procedures.

- The RWC did not cancel the landing clearance for Aircraft B despite the runway incursion. This was not in line with the ATSM procedures.

The AIB summarized the decisive sequence of events:

At 0435:47 hrs, after observing that Aircraft A had taxied onto RET T6 and was in contact with the GMC, the RWC issued clearance for another Boeing 787-9 (Aircraft B), which was about 2nm away from the runway threshold, to land on Runway 02C. At this point, Aircraft A was still in motion, taxiing on RET T6 and had yet to cross the runway holding position marking on RET T6 Exit A. The RWC issued the landing clearance to Aircraft B in anticipation that Aircraft A would soon have vacated from RET T6 onto Taxiway T (please see para 1.9.1.1 for the procedures of the air traffic services provider (ATSP))

At 0436:37 hrs, the RWC and GMC verbally mentioned that Aircraft A appeared to have stopped on RET T6 close to the runway holding position marking on RET T6 Exit B. According to the RWC, at that instant, Aircraft B was over the threshold of Runway 02C. According to the PF of Aircraft A, as the aircraft arrived at the Exit A and Exit B bifurcation, the PF heard the PM calling out for the aircraft to be stopped. The PM made the call after assessing that there was insufficient clearance (i.e. manoeuvre space) for the aircraft to turn into Exit A. The PF stopped the aircraft as per the PM’s callout, in accordance with the operator’s crew resource management policy.

Even though the RWC was aware that Aircraft A had come to a stop and was unable to vacate RET T6, the RWC did not cancel Aircraft B’s landing clearance and instruct Aircraft B to go around. The RWC’s considerations were as follows:

- The tail of Aircraft A was clear of the runway and there was no immediate obstruction that would interfere with Aircraft B's landing; and

- Aircraft B was already over the threshold of Runway 02C and the RWC believed that it would be safer to allow Aircraft B to continue landing instead of instructing it to go around as it was in a critical operating phase for Aircraft B’s flight crew which was documented as a note in the ATSM.

After Aircraft B had landed, the RWC instructed Aircraft B to vacate the runway via RET T4.


 


 


 


Accident: LATAM A320 at Asuncion on Oct 27th 2022, storm damage, both engines flamed out, one engine relighted

By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Oct 27th 2022 14:41Z, last updated Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 15:33Z

See photos of the aircraft seen after landing: (Photos in the original article.)


A LATAM Airbus A320-200, registration CC-BAZ performing flight LA-1325 (dep Oct 26th 2022) from Santiago (Chile) to Asuncion (Paraguay) with 48 people on board, was on approach to Asuncion's runway 20 when the crew initiated a go around from about 2400 feet MSL due to weather. The aircraft diverted to Foz de Iguacu ,PR (Brazil) for a safe landing on runway 33 about 40 minutes after the go around.

The aircraft remained on the ground in Foz de Iguacu for about 3:20 hours, then departed runway 15 to Asuncion again. On approach to Asuncion's runway 20 the aircraft flew through a thunderstorm and received damage to its radome but continued for a landing on Asuncion's runway 20 about 5 hours after the go around. There were no injuries.

The airline reported the aircraft encountered severe weather on its flight path and performed an emergency landing in Asuncion. Passengers and crew disembarked in good condition.

On Nov 7th 2022 Paraguay's AIB reported the aircraft was left with a disintegrated radome and broken windshields due to multiple impacts caused by a severe storm and hail leading to a forced landing. The occurrence was rated a serious incident (damage and injuries unknown), an investigation has been opened.

In December 2024 Airbus' Safetyfirst Magazine published an article stating that both engines temporarily flamed out causing electric failure, electricity was restored with the APU coming online, seven relight attempts failed with thrust levers in TOGA position until the crew selected the thrust levers to IDLE as per AOM and an APU assisted relight attempt of one engine succeeded. The aircraft landed on single engine. Airbus wrote:

During the night flight, persistent adverse weather remained along their route.

The flight crew requested a northward deviation to avoid storm cells that they detected on their weather radar. The aircraft was cruising at FL 240 with autopilot and autothrust ON when the flight crew executed a 90° left turn toward their final destination.

Severe storm and dual engine flameout

Shortly after the turn, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence and hail. Loud impact noises were heard, and both the left and right windscreen sustained damage. Several ECAM alerts were triggered, including ANTI ICE R WINDSHIELD, ANTI ICE L WINDSHIELD, ENG 1 STALL, NAV RA 2 FAULT.

The autopilot and autothrust disconnected, and within one second, the cockpit went dark. Flight recorder data is not available for the following 2 min and 46 s due to an EMER ELEC configuration. During this time, the thrust levers were moved to TOGA position.

Both engines had flamed out combined with an unreliable airspeed indication. The flight crew switched the APU to ON. When the APU came online, electrical power was restored. The aircraft pitch was 3.5°, corresponding to the pitch provided in the QRH to reach the optimum windmill relight speed. The speed, which was unreliable, was 232 kt indicated on the captain PFD and the aircraft altitude was 18 100 ft 5 900 ft lost from cruise altitude). The aircraft was in ALTERNATE flight control law and thrust levers remained in the TOGA position.

One windmilling relight attempt of ENG 2 was recorded, then the flight crew switched APU BLEED ON and performed several simultaneous attempts (both ENG Master switches ON at the same time) of starter-assisted engine relight with the thrust levers still in the TOGA position. The flight crew eventually set the thrust levers to IDLE and both master levers OFF before performing a successful ENG1 starter-assisted relight with ENG 2 master switch left to the OFF position. The altitude was 9 100 ft, representing a loss of 14 900 ft from the cruise altitude. The flight crew then tried to relight engine #2 twice, but both attempts were unsuccessful.

Safe landing with single engine, unreliable airspeed and ALTERNATE law

The aircraft emerged from the storm and continued to the destination airport. The flight crew performed a safe landing with a single engine operative, ALTERNATE flight control law, unreliable airspeed indication, and significantly damaged windshields impairing visibility.

The aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Airbus analysed:

Unsuccessful weather avoidance

Night conditions and numerous storms in the area made effective weather avoidance challenging. Despite having an automatic radar and performing both automatic and manual scanning, the flight crew entered a severe hailstorm.

Extreme weather conditions

The hailstorm significantly exceeded the engine design and certification criteria. The water/ice content was approximately twice the level for which engines are designed and certied. This explains the observed engine damage and flameout.

Radome damage impact

Radome damage disrupted airflow around the air data probes, causing unreliable airspeed indications and reversion to the ALTERNATE flight control law.

Thrust lever positioning

The thrust levers remained in the TOGA position during seven relight attempts. The ALL ENG FAIL QRH procedure requires setting the thrust levers to IDLE before attempting to relight the engines.

Unsuccessful engine relight attempts

Recorder's data enabled analysis of the sequence of the various engine relight attempts.

The flight crew cycled the ENG 2 master switch OFF then ON 2 s later. They switched the ENG 1 master switch to OFF. APU BLEED was set to ON shortly after. The ENG 1 master switch was then set back to ON 6s after being switched OFF. 10 s later, the ENG 1 master switch was cycled OFF then ON. 25 s later, both ENG 1 and ENG 2 master switches were cycled OFF then ON. The flight crew then cycled ENG 1 master switch again shortly followed by ENG 2 master switch. All relight attempts were unsuccessful. The thrust levers remained in the TOGA position.

These Simultaneous starter-assisted relight attempts failed due to the fact that APU bleed provides sucient air pressure to restart only one engine at a time. It was observed that no ventilation of 30s was performed between each relight attempt.

Successful ENG 1 relight

The crew then set the thrust levers to IDLE and set both engine master switches to OFF. The ENG 1 master switch was set back to ON, while the ENG 2 master switch was briefly set to ON then back to OFF. Within 1 minute and 45 seconds, ENG1 N2 and EGT increased and ENG1 successfully restarted.

The ENG 2 master switch being OFF enabled sufficient bleed pressure to be delivered to ENG 1 starter for a successful relight.

Damaged ENG2

The flight crew then tried two ENG 2 relights, but both attempts remained unsuccessful. Detailed inspection revealed sufficient damage to ENG 2 preventing successful inflight restart.

Significant relight time and altitude loss

ENG 1 became available 8 min 26 s after the all-engine flameout. The aircraft altitude was 9 100 ft, representing a loss of 14 900 ft from the 24 000 ft initial cruise altitude.

Metars Asuncion:
SGAS 270400Z 00000KT 9999 BKN020 21/20 Q1007=
SGAS 270300Z 23004KT 9999 SCT020 22/20 Q1008 RETS=
SGAS 270200Z 05009KT 9999 TS FEW010 OVC020 FEW040CB 22/21 Q1007=
SGAS 270114Z 06005KT 9999 TS FEW010 OVC020 FEW040CB 22/21 Q1007=
SGAS 270100Z 24010G28KT 9999 TS FEW010 OVC020 FEW040CB 23/21 Q1008=
SGAS 270036Z 07015G26KT 9000 -TSRA SCT008 OVC020 FEW040CB 22/21 Q1003=
SGAS 270000Z VRB05KT 8000 -TSRA SCT008 OVC020 FEW040CB 23/21 Q1006=
SGAS 262300Z VRB06KT 7000 TSRA SCT008 OVC020 FEW040CB 22/22 Q1007=
SGAS 262200Z 18017KT 7000 TSRA SCT008 OVC020 FEW040CB 22/22 Q1007=
SGAS 262132Z 21027G38KT 0200 +TSRA SCT008 OVC020 FEW040CB 22/22 Q1006=
SGAS 262122Z 20026G40KT 1500 +TSRA SCT010 OVC020 FEW040CB 24/21 Q1006=
SGAS 262100Z 19030G40KT 5000 TSRA BKN010 OVC027 FEW040CB 26/21 Q1005=
SGAS 262038Z 03009KT 9999 TS SCT027 FEW040CB 33/21 Q1001=
SGAS 262038Z 03009KT 9999 TS SCT027 FEW040CB 33/21 Q1001=
SGAS 262000Z 02010KT 9999 FEW033 34/21 Q1001=
SGAS 261900Z 36016KT 310V020 9999 FEW033 35/20 Q1002=
SGAS 261800Z 01018KT CAVOK 36/21 Q1002=
SGAS 261700Z 36019KT 9999 FEW033 36/20 Q1004=
SGAS 261600Z 02022G32KT 9999 FEW033 35/19 Q1005=

Metars Foz de Iguacu:
SBFI 270400Z 34012KT 9999 -TSRA SCT020 FEW025CB 20/18 Q1012=
SBFI 270300Z 07006KT 9999 VCTS SCT020 FEW025CB 20/18 Q1012=
SBFI 270200Z 16007KT 9999 VCTS SCT020 FEW025CB 20/18 Q1013 RETS=
SBFI 270100Z 18008KT 9999 -TSRA SCT020 FEW025CB 21/18 Q1013 RERA=
SBFI 270021Z 22007KT 9999 -TSRA SCT020 FEW025CB 21/18 Q1013 RERA=
SBFI 270000Z 21013G28KT 5000 TSRA SCT020 FEW025CB 23/18 Q1011=
SBFI 270000Z 21013G28KT 5000 TSRA SCT020 FEW025CB 23/18 Q1011=
SBFI 262346Z 23013G26KT 9999 FEW020 FEW025TCU 25/18 Q1010=
SBFI 262300Z 04004KT 9999 FEW020 29/16 Q1006=
SBFI 262200Z 02007KT 9999 FEW020 31/15 Q1005=
SBFI 262100Z 02009KT 9999 FEW020 32/14 Q1005=
SBFI 262000Z 02012KT 9999 FEW020 34/13 Q1004=
SBFI 261900Z 36014KT CAVOK 34/14 Q1005=
SBFI 261900Z 36014KT CAVOK 34/14 Q1005=
SBFI 261800Z 36014G24KT 9999 FEW020 35/13 Q1006=
SBFI 261700Z 36013KT CAVOK 34/14 Q1007=
SBFI 261600Z 36014KT CAVOK 33/14 Q1008=

The aircraft seen after landing: (Photos in the original article.)





 


Ryanair B738 near Rome on Dec 15th 2024, electrical/navigation problems

By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 18:14Z, last updated Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 18:14Z

A Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-ESS performing flight FR-245 from Tenerife South,CI (Spain) to Rome Fiumicino (Italy), was in the initial descent towards Rome when the crew reported electrical problems prompting emergency response at the airport as well as the sea west of Rome. The aircraft continued for a safe landing on Fiumicino's runway 34R about 25 minutes later.

The airline reported the aircraft suffered navigational problems, the aircraft landed safely and cancelled the emergency.

The occurrence aircraft returned to service about 43.5 hours after landing.







 


Investigators Uncover Violations in Helicopter Crash, Raise Concerns Over Regulatory Gaps in Nigerian Aviation

The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) has revealed a troubling series of regulatory violations concerning the October 24, 2024, crash of a Sikorsky SK76 helicopter operated by East Aviation in Port Harcourt.

The incident, which occurred off the coast of Calabar, resulted in the loss of eight lives, including six passengers and two crew members. Five of the victims’ bodies have been recovered, while three others remain missing.

The NSIB’s preliminary findings, presented by Alex Badeh, the Bureau’s Director-General, highlighted several violations of Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations (Nig. CARs), which are designed to ensure the safety of air travel in the country. These violations, although not directly linked to the cause of the crash, point to significant gaps in the oversight and enforcement of aviation safety standards.

One of the most serious violations uncovered was that the crashed helicopter was not equipped with a Flight Data Recorder (FDR), despite being required by Part 7.8.2.2(q) of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations (Nig. CARs) of 2023. This regulation mandates that helicopters with a maximum takeoff weight exceeding 3,175 kg must be fitted with an FDR to record critical flight data. The lack of this crucial safety equipment has raised questions about the adequacy of safety measures on commercial helicopters operating in Nigeria.
In addition to the absence of an FDR, the NSIB noted that the helicopter’s crew used non-standard phraseology during the flight, a significant concern as clear, standardized communication is vital for ensuring safety in aviation operations. The report revealed that standard callouts a series of predefined verbal communication protocols required at different stages of flight were absent, further indicating poor adherence to safety protocols. Furthermore, the helicopter’s radio altimeter was found to have a snag and had been deferred just six days prior to the crash.

The absence of essential dew point data in the weather information given to the flight crew on the day of the accident was also flagged. This crucial meteorological information could have provided the crew with vital insights into weather conditions, particularly when flying over challenging terrains or bodies of water like the Atlantic Ocean.
In an analysis of the crash, Badeh explained that the helicopter appeared to be struggling to maintain its balance before it ultimately plunged into the ocean. This struggle was accompanied by an aural warning from the aircraft, which repeatedly stated: “Bank angle, Bank angle,” a common warning in flight control systems when the aircraft is at an unsafe angle. According to the NSIB, this was the last recorded message before the helicopter’s descent, accompanied by signs of smoke emanating from the engine—a significant indication of mechanical failure just before the crash.

While the NSIB stopped short of directly linking these regulatory violations to the cause of the crash, the findings underscore troubling gaps in the regulatory framework governing Nigeria’s aviation industry. The violations are particularly concerning given the importance of flight data recorders, standardized communications, and pre-flight safety checks in preventing accidents.

These issues highlight ongoing challenges within Nigeria’s aviation regulatory environment, which has faced criticism in the past for its failure to fully enforce safety standards and ensure compliance with international aviation norms. The fact that such a critical helicopter was allowed to fly without an FDR raises serious questions about the oversight capabilities of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), the agency responsible for ensuring the safety of civil aviation in the country.

In light of the findings, the NSIB has called for stricter enforcement of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations (Nig. CARs), particularly Part 7.8.2.2(q), which mandates the installation of Flight Data Recorders on helicopters with a maximum take-off mass over 3,175 kg and up to 7,000 kg. The Bureau has urged the NCAA to ensure that such violations are thoroughly investigated and that all helicopters operating in Nigeria are compliant with the required safety standards.

Additionally, the NSIB’s report on the incident serves as a stark reminder of the importance of adhering to aviation safety protocols and conducting regular maintenance checks on critical systems such as altimeters and weather instruments. The Bureau’s findings could serve as a basis for future reforms within the country’s aviation sector, aimed at preventing similar incidents and enhancing air travel safety.

The NSIB’s investigation is ongoing, and the final report is expected to provide further insights into the factors contributing to the crash. In the meantime, the NCAA is likely to face increased scrutiny over its regulatory practices, especially in light of the NSIB’s calls for better enforcement of safety regulations. Stakeholders in the aviation sector, including aircraft operators and aviation authorities, will need to work closely to ensure that safety remains a top priority, and that such tragic accidents are prevented in the future.






 


India Express B738 at Kochi on Dec 17th 2024, tyre damage on departure

By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 18:03Z, last updated Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 18:03Z

An Air India Express Boeing 737-800, registration VT-GHD performing flight IX-471 from Kochi (India) to Bahrain (Bahrain) with 104 passengers and 8 crew, departed Kochi's runway 09 and climbed to cruise level FL340. The aircraft was enroute over the Arabian Sea about 240nm northwest of Kochi when the crew was informed that tyre debris had been found on the departure runway prompting the crew to return to Kochi. The aircraft performed a low approach to runway 09, positioned for a full stop landing and landed on runway 09 without further incident about 1:45 hours after departure.

A replacement Boeing 737-800 registration VT-GHE reached Bahrain with a delay of about 5:20 hours.

The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Kochi about 11 hours after landing.





 


New FAA rule requires U.S. agent for pilots with foreign addresses
By General Aviation News Staff · December 17, 2024 · 

Starting Jan. 6, 2025, the FAA will require individuals with foreign addresses and no U.S. physical address on file with the FAA to designate a U.S. agent for service if they apply for or hold certain FAA certificates, ratings, or authorizations.

This rule applies to certificates issued under 14 CFR parts 47, 61, 63, 65, 67, or 107.

This change, published in the Federal Register on Oct. 8, 2024, aims to enhance aviation safety by ensuring timely communication with certificate holders residing abroad, according to FAA officials. The previous process of serving documents internationally often led to significant delays, potentially compromising safety, as individuals might unknowingly continue operating under suspended or revoked certificates, officials noted.

The U.S. agent, who can be an individual or an entity, will receive FAA communications on the certificate holder’s behalf and is responsible for promptly forwarding them. A U.S. physical address, excluding P.O. boxes or commercial-only addresses, is required for the agent.

FAA officials acknowledged this rule will impose costs on individuals for designating and maintaining a U.S. agent, but emphasize the “crucial role of prompt communication in upholding aviation safety.”





 


Gol B738 at Porto Alegre on Dec 15th 2024, flaps problem

By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 17:28Z, last updated Tuesday, Dec 17th 2024 17:28Z

A Gol Linhas Aereas Boeing 737-800, registration PR-GZI performing flight G3-1885 from Sao Paulo Guarulhos,SP to Porto Alegre,RS (Brazil) with 186 people on board, was on final approach to Porto Alegre's runway 29 when the crew initiated a go around due to reporting locked flaps. The crew decided to divert to Canoas Airforce Base advising ATC they could not land at Porto Alegre or Floripa. The aircraft positioned for landing on Canoas' runway 30 at a slightly higher than normal speed.

The airline reported a technical problem.

The aircraft remained on the ground for about 26 hours, then positioned Belo Horizonte,MG (Brazil) and is still on the ground in Belo Horizonte about 17 hours after landing.




 


FAA Encouraging GA Safety Management Systems
New release recommends updating SMS standards to match those of EASA.
	
Mark Phelps
Updated Dec 18, 2024 4:23 AM EST
Credit: National Business Aviation Association

Earlier this month, the FAA issued an Information for Operators (InFO) release encouraging general aviation organizations to develop and implement a voluntary Safety Management System (SMS) meeting current U.S. standards that are consistent with those of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This InFO addresses an update published in April 2024 toward that goal, but did not adequately address issues related to operators of “large and turbojet aircraft operated internationally … as well as part 145 repair stations with European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) authorizations.”

In the “discussion” section of the InFO, the FAA described an SMS as integrating “risk management into normal day-to-day business practices.” Under ICAO standards, an SMS is “commensurate with the size and complexity of the operation and meet the criteria established by the State of Registry.” ICAO recommends that a General Aviation SMS include processes to identify actual and potential safety hazards and assess associated risks, develop and implement remedial action necessary to maintain an acceptable level of safety and include a provision for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of safety management activities.
The InFO concludes: “Aviation Organizations are encouraged to incorporate SMSs as a standard business practice regardless of type of aircraft operated.”


 


EU Bans Air Tanzania On Safety Grounds
Victoria Moores 
December 16, 2024

Credit: Andres Martinez Casares/Getty Images

Africa’s Air Tanzania has been banned from operating to and within the EU under the latest iteration of the EU Air Safety List.
The decision to ban Air Tanzania was based on the unanimous opinion of EU safety experts, who met in Brussels on Nov. 19-21. It was supported by the European Parliament Transport Committee.

“The basis for this decision is safety concerns identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency [EASA],” the EC said, announcing the update on Dec. 12. “These also led to the decision not to grant Air Tanzania a third-country operator [TCO] authorization.”

Apostolos Tzitzikostas, the newly appointed commissioner for sustainable transport and tourism, said the EC has offered to help the Tanzanian authorities improve Air Tanzania’s safety performance.

“We strongly urge Air Tanzania to take swift and decisive action to address these safety issues,” Tzitzikostas said.

The Aviation Week Network Fleet Discovery database shows Air Tanzania operates a fleet of Boeing 787, 767F, 737-9, Airbus A220 and De Havilland Canada Dash 8 aircraft.

In November, EASA decided to lift its TCO suspension on Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), which was in place for four years. EASA also granted TCO approval to another Pakistani airline, Airblue Limited.

As of the Dec. 12 update, a total of 129 airlines are banned from EU airspace. The list includes seven airlines with “serious safety deficiencies,” 100 airlines in 15 countries banned because of weak national oversight and 22 Russian airlines.

Air Tanzania becomes the seventh carrier that is banned on an individual basis, joining Air Zimbabwe, Venezuela’s Avior Airlines, Suriname’s Blue Wing Airlines, Iran Aseman Airlines, and Iraqi carriers Fly Baghdad and Iraqi Airways.
Additionally, two airlines—Iran Air and North Korea’s Air Koryo—can only fly to the EU with specific aircraft types.


 


EU safety agency lifts ban on Pakistan national airline after four years
By Reuters
November 29, 20249:17 AM CSTUpdated 19 days ago

View of the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) passenger plane, taken through a glass panel, at Islamabad International Airport, Pakistan October 3, 2023. 

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has lifted its bar on Pakistan International Airlines from operating in the bloc, it said on Friday.

EASA suspended PIA's authorisation to operate in the EU in June 2020 over concerns the ability of Pakistani authorities and its Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA) to ensure compliance with international aviation standards.

The suspension came days after Pakistan launched an investigation into the validity of pilots' licenses issued in the country following a PIA plane crash that killed 97 people.

"EASA has now re-established sufficient confidence in the PCAA oversight capabilities," an EASA spokesperson said in a statement emailed to Reuters.
It said that the decision to authorise PIA to perform commercial air transport operations to, from and within the EU was based on the "significant efforts" made by the PCAA.

Pakistan had grounded 262 of the country's 860 pilots, including 141 of PIA's 434, whose licences the then aviation minister termed "dubious". The investigation ultimately did not reveal any major concerns, but the suspension remained in place.

PIA in a statement also welcomed the announcement, vowing to abide by EASA regulations.

Defence Minister Khwaja Asif, while speaking to local broadcaster Geo News, said the lifting of the ban would revitalise the debt-ridden national flag carrier and the effort to privatise it.

The ban was costing PIA nearly 40 billion Pakistani rupees ($144 million) in revenue annually, according to government records presented in parliament.

PIA and the government had been pressing EASA to lift the ban even provisionally. The government's attempt to privatise the airline fell flat when it received only a single offer, that too well below its asking price.
"Wonderful news of lifting of the ban on PIA flights in the entire European Union," Pakistan Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said in a post in social media platform X.


 


Curt Lewis