Flight Safety Information - February 12, 2025 No. 031 In This Issue : Accident: GOL B38M at Rio de Janeiro on Feb 11th 2025, rejected takeoff after collision with car : Incident: Hawaiian A332 at Honolulu on Feb 9th 2025, engine fuel leak : Incident: Republic E175 at Washington on Feb 8th 2025, slat problem : Incident: Binter AT72 near Las Palmas on Feb 7th 2025, engine failure : FAA reopens two runways at DCA following helicopter and jet mid-air collision : If the Reagan Airport crash was “waiting to happen,” why didn’t anyone stop it? : FAA Wants Permanent Helicopter Restrictions at Reagan Airport : Honolulu To Seattle Hawaiian Airlines Takes Decisive Action With Emergency Landing After Engine Smoke Threat : FAA's Staffing Troubles Make Flying More Dangerous, Controllers Say : Bering Air crash investigation prompts questions surrounding aviation technology in Alaska : Unprecedented gear failure suspected in Arizona jet crash tragedy : Spirit Airlines restructuring update: Frontier’s proposal rejected : Boeing says it delivered 45 aircraft in busiest January since 2023 : ‘New’ F-35 Assembled from Two Wrecked Jets Makes Its First Flight : Calendar of Events Accident: GOL B38M at Rio de Janeiro on Feb 11th 2025, rejected takeoff after collision with car A GOL Transportes Aereos Boeing 737-8 MAX, registration PS-GPP performing flight G3-1674 from Rio de Janeiro Galeao,RJ to Fortaleza,CE (Brazil), was accelerating for takeoff from Galeao's runway 10 at 22:09L (01:09Z Feb 12th) when a bang was heard, the aircraft veered sharply to the right towards the right runway edge before steering back towards the center line while the aircraft slowed down. After coming to a stop short of the end of the runway the captain announced they had collided with a service vehicle on the runway. The passengers disembarked via mobile stairs onto the runway. The airport reported there had been an incident between a maintenance car and an aircraft on one of the runways, there had been no injuries. The passengers have disembarked normally, operation of the airport was not affected. The airline reported the aircraft collided with an airport vehicle on the runway during the takeoff procedure. Takeoff was rejected and all passengers and crew disembarked safely. A replacement flight to Fortaleza was made available. The airline is cooperating with CENIPA's investigation into the accident. A passenger (a public prosecutor) stated, that the aircraft was close to becoming airborne, when there was a jolt and a noise followed by the crew braking the aircraft. https://avherald.com/h?article=523ff442&opt=0 Incident: Hawaiian A332 at Honolulu on Feb 9th 2025, engine fuel leak A Hawaiian Airlines Airbus A330-200, registration N375HA performing flight HA-22 from Honolulu,HI to Seattle,WA (USA) with 278 people on board, was in the initial climb out of Honolulu's runway 08R when the crew requested to level off at 3000 feet and return to the airfield advising, they had a continuous trail coming out of the #1 engine (Trent 772, left hand) and requested the emergency services on arrival. The aircraft returned to Honolulu for a safe landing on runway 08L about 15 minutes after departure. The crew shut both engines down and did not activate the APU due to the leak concerns, emergency services confirmed a fuel leak from the left hand engine. A replacement A330-200 registration N360HA reached Seattle with a delay of about 6:15 hours. The FAA reported: "Hawaiian Airlines Flight 22 returned safely to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport in Honolulu around 2:05 p.m. local time on Sunday, Feb. 9, after the crew reported engine issues. The Airbus A330-200 was originally headed to Seattle – Tacoma International Airport. The FAA will investigate." The occurrence aircraft returned to service about 22 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=523f91e8&opt=0 Incident: Republic E175 at Washington on Feb 8th 2025, slat problem A Republic Airways Embraer ERJ-175 on behalf of American Airlines, registration N112HQ performing flight AA-4689 from Washington National,DC to Miami,FL (USA) with 80 people on board, was climbing out of National's runway 19 when the crew stopped the climb at FL240 reporting a problem with the slats and decided to divert to Washington International,DC (USA). The aircraft landed safely on Dulles Airport's runway 19C about 65 minutes after departure. A replacement E175 registration N125HQ reached Miami with a delay of about 5 hours. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for about 63 hours, then positioned to Indianapolis,IN (USA). https://avherald.com/h?article=523f827b&opt=0 Incident: Binter AT72 near Las Palmas on Feb 7th 2025, engine failure A Binter Canarias Avions de Transport Regional ATR-72-212A, registration EC-MXQ performing flight NT-283 from Fuerteventura,CI to Las Palmas,CI (Spain), was descending through about 6000 feet towards Las Palmas when the crew declared emergency reporting one of the engines (PW127M) had failed. The aircraft continued for a safe landing on Las Palmas' runway 03L about 10 minutes later. The aircraft remained on the ground for about 46 hours before returning to service. https://avherald.com/h?article=523ece13&opt=0 FAA reopens two runways at DCA following helicopter and jet mid-air collision American Eagle and American Airlines planes taxi at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, on February 6, 2025 in Arlington, Va. The Federal Aviation Administration has reopened two of the airport's runways following the January 29 mid-air collision between a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and an American Airlines regional jet that was landing at DCA. American Eagle and American Airlines planes taxi at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, on February 6, 2025 in Arlington, Va. The Federal Aviation Administration has reopened two of the airport's runways following the January 29 mid-air collision between a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and an American Airlines regional jet that was landing at DCA. The Federal Aviation Administration has reopened two runways at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. They were closed after the January 29 mid-air collision between a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and American Airlines regional jet that was attempting to land at DCA. D.C. plane and helicopter crash Map: See the aircraft's paths before they collided near Washington, D.C. Both aircraft plunged into the Potomac River, killing all 67 people aboard in the nighttime collision that occurred at approximately 300 feet in the air. DCA has three runways. The two that were closed – runways 4/22 and 15/33 – are shorter than the main runway and typically used during busier periods at the airport to alleviate congestion and smooth the flow of traffic into and out of DCA. With the reopening of these runways, the FAA says it has increased the hourly arrival rate to 28 aircraft. The typical maximum arrival rate is 32 flights every hour. The restrictions on helicopter traffic around DCA remain in effect as the National Transportation Safety Board investigation continues. The NTSB says it expects to release its preliminary report into the cause of the crash around February 28. https://www.npr.org/2025/02/11/g-s1-48207/faa-runways-dca-american-black-hawk If the Reagan Airport crash was “waiting to happen,” why didn’t anyone stop it? It’s surprisingly common for “it’s just a matter of time” warnings to get ignored in aviation. It suggests rot in the air safety system — but also beyond it. Ari Schulman If you study air and space disasters, you will notice a recurring pattern: there are often well-placed observers who know almost immediately what went wrong. Sometimes those observers had even been warning that a disaster exactly like that was coming — that it was just a matter of time. A few examples: The Max 8’s faulty pilot override: In 2019, when an Ethiopia Airlines flight fell out of the sky near Addis Ababa, within a day, numerous media articles speculated that the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which was designed to override pilot controls and push the plane’s nose down when it detected a potential stall, had mistakenly triggered during normal flight. The official investigation showed that this was indeed the direct cause — as well as the cause of the Lion Air crash in Indonesia four months earlier. The loss of the space shuttle Challenger: In 1986, following the Challenger tragedy, informed observers speculated immediately that a defective O-ring on one of the solid rocket boosters might be at fault. Leaks of burning gas through the O-rings had been documented routinely since the start of the program. A booster engineer had urged NASA the day before not to launch, arguing that the freak 20-degree weather the shuttle had been sitting in was far outside the boosters’ designed temperature window, and posed a danger of failure. The official investigation showed this exact explanation to be why the Challenger was lost. The loss of the space shuttle Columbia: When the shuttle launched in 2003, onboard cameras recorded chunks of foam shedding from the fuel tank and striking the orbiter. Just two hours after the shuttle broke up on re-entry, CNN was reporting live on air that NASA had noted that a debris strike on the heat shield might have played a role. This was later confirmed by official investigators as the cause of the disaster. Notably, once the shuttle was in orbit, NASA had debated sending the astronauts on a spacewalk to inspect the foam damage up close. But they decided against it, reasoning that the foam strike problem had already proved routine and survivable, and that there was nothing more to be done now that the shuttle was in orbit. This conclusion was wrong: investigators found that NASA had actually had viable options to either repair the hole in orbit or to launch a second shuttle to mount a rescue mission. So what about the fatal collision two weeks ago? The initial evidence already fits this same pattern. Shocking if not surprising investigations from the Wall Street Journal and ABC News find that pilots at Reagan National Airport, also known as DCA, had been formally warning the Federal Aviation Administration for more than three decades of nearly hitting military helicopters traversing the same corridor. Pilots who had faced this exact situation filed these reports to the FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System: In 2013: “I cannot imagine what business is so pressing that these helicopters are allowed to cross the path of airliners carrying hundreds of people! What would normally be alarming at any other airport in the country has become commonplace at DCA.” In 2006: “Why does the tower allow such nonsense by the military in such a critical area? This is a safety issue, and needs to be fixed.” In 1993: “This is an accident waiting to happen.” In 1991: “Here is an accident waiting to happen.” An investigation by the Washington Post is even more damning. Using simple, publicly available information, the Post’s reporters quickly discovered what the FAA had missed or ignored: The helicopter flight path and the airplane landing path at their closest point have a vertical separation of just 15 feet. And that separation assumes that aircraft, which must be under manual control in this area, fly perfectly. In reality, the Post’s analysis of actual flight paths from just one recent day found that several landing planes had entered the official helicopter flight path. And there is some reporting that it was not unheard of for helicopters to veer above the 200-foot altitude limit, upping the odds of entering the flight path for landing airplanes — a situation that appears to have happened just one day before the collision, when a Republic Airways flight aborted its landing at DCA to avoid a military helicopter flying below it at 300 feet. All this raises an obvious question: If all this knowledge was so easy for outsiders to obtain, why didn’t leaders on the inside do this analysis in advance? If there are repeated warnings that a very specific type of disaster is “waiting to happen,” and the source of the problem is already known too, why wait for the tragedy and the “I told you so” before taking action? Why wait for the crash to act? There are actually several good, or at least organizationally understandable, reasons why that kind of proactive approach is easier said than done. Consider: Hindsight is 20/20: Rarely did these observers know with certainty that the disaster they imagined would occur, much less how soon. An air safety system that can reasonably expect a fatal loss of a major airliner once every 50 years would be the safest in history; one that expects the same lapse every 5 years would, by today’s standards, rightly be considered a failure. But the difference is a matter of degree. Disastership bias: The opposite of survivorship bias is at play: We mostly hear about these “it was only a matter of time” predictions when they come true. But many more never do — or indeed are patched in time. The public largely doesn’t hear about these. The financial cost: Without knowing which of the predictions will come true and which won’t, safety authorities rightly have to pick and choose which ones to direct their finite resources to address, and which to leave be. It’s a pragmatic reality that many warnings can’t get fully acted on, and that some of those will eventually be proved right. The political cost: Some disaster prophesies are so significant that they may implicate an entire program, paradigm, or organization. The Boeing Max crashes were like this: they cast doubt on whether the entire design philosophy used for the new airframe might have been mistaken. But the company’s entire strategic outlook, its theory of dominance against Airbus, was staked on that choice. The revelation that the choice was a mistake has now snowballed into a crisis of confidence in Boeing’s entire management paradigm of the past 30 years, one so profound that it now threatens the company’s very existence. The Columbia disaster was also like this, in that it revealed fatal flaws in the very concept of the shuttle — like the design decision to place the critical and fragile heat shield right next to the volatile launch system, and the failed promise of space flight that was so routine it was cheap. The last of these costs is the most significant. No matter how much technical expertise and neutral proceduralism you throw at the problem, it simply runs against any large bureaucracy’s operational tides to surface concerns that could implicate its very legitimacy, its nature, its mandate to exist. In safety studies, normalized deviance is the pattern by which a system creeps from labeling specific behaviors “dangerous” to labeling them “abnormal but not yet a proven danger” to labeling them “well, I know, but we’ve been doing it this way all along” to labeling them “normal”: What is so curious about last week’s crash is that we had just had a 15-year period where no major U.S. airline suffered a fatal crash. It would have been hard for even the most optimistic observer in the 1960s or 1970s to have ever anticipated such a wild success — and the fact of it alone suggests that America’s air safety system remains one of the best examples in the world of addressing patterns like normalized deviance. This in turn means that we should be wary of seeing the DCA crash as some freak exception. If a system has become one of the shining examples in history of solving a specific problem, only then to be embarrassed by precisely that problem, we shouldn’t be content just to say “even the best sometimes fail.” It may instead be that we failed to understand what the system really does, what it is and isn’t for. It is insane — absolutely insane — to have an official helicopter flight path cross over a final descent path of one of the busiest airports in the country. It is insane to do this while having the helicopters and landing planes use radio systems that don’t let them talk to each other. It is insane to have the helicopters often be military craft on training missions, running with barely any lights, in the middle of a sprawling urban lightscape, at night. It is insane to have those pilots often use night-vision goggles that block out their peripheral vision when the planes they have to watch for are arriving from the side. It is insane to have the air traffic control tower managing this setup be understaffed, at just 63 percent of its FAA-recommended level as of September 2023. It is insane for all this to happen below 1,000 feet, where the standard collision avoidance system for commercial aircraft by design shuts off. In bare geometric terms, only two things stood in the way of all that insanity and a collision: Horizontal separation: Air traffic controllers instructing helicopter pilots to cross the airplane flight path in between the landing planes, and permitting the helicopter pilots to rely on vision alone to spot and correctly identify the planes. During peak hours, planes take off and land at DCA at a pace faster than one per minute. Vertical separation: 15 feet between the official helicopter and plane flight paths. With over two million takeoffs and landings from Reagan Airport every decade, there are simply no human pilots and air traffic controllers who could have avoided these minuscule margins for error every single time. If this sounds like undue speculation at this stage of an ongoing investigation, note that the FAA closed the helicopter flight path to all but emergency and presidential uses just two days after the collision. That is faster even than it grounded the Boeing Max fleet after two separate crashes made it obvious that the new plane’s design was faulty. That is one of the odd consequences of the organizational patterns I’m describing: It really is the case that an insider who isn’t beholden to protecting the system, a sharp outsider, or even just a man on the street can sometimes easily see a devastating flaw that the organization itself doesn’t. This is such a common pattern that we cannot ascribe it to ordinary error, a process flaw, or even gross incompetence. And that is especially true at an organization with such a remarkable track record as the FAA. This pattern arises because most organizations want to keep on existing, and want to ignore signs that they should not. The same is true for bedrock assumptions about what the organization is, what it’s for, or whether it is the right one to take on the problem it’s been tasked with. Paper clip factory managers are probably better than the average person at knowing how to make paper clips, but worse at knowing when you’d be better off using a stapler or just sending an email. The drive not to ask these existential questions permeates an organization’s design at every level, right down to what its smartest members see and what they’re blind to. Learning from disaster There are already signs that the DCA collision may meet this same pattern: that it didn’t just suffer a process lapse, like the deviation spiral illustration above, but showed the kind of perverse behavior that sets in when an organization is forced to manage a bad mandate it can’t change. Consider the wide accommodations to typical air safety best-practices granted for military and government purposes. Not only was a major military base permitted to run helicopter training flights right by the airport, but it was doing so because those flights ferry diplomats, visiting officials, and other government VIPs around the city on a daily basis. These carveouts appear to have been as much imposed on the air safety system as granted by it. The FAA has a laser-focused safety mission, so far as it goes — but its authority has limits. Or consider the enormous volume of flights permitted at DCA, which is such a sensitive airspace that any time new regular flights are added they must be specifically approved by Congress. They have been steadily growing for years in part due to members of Congress working to add direct access between the city and their home districts. And for good reason: Dulles Airport, conceived in 1950 to serve as the main airport for the capital, is so far away, so huge, and so over-designed that it might as well be a labyrinth on Mars. Or consider the very decision to locate a major military base with a significant training mandate, the central buildings of all three branches of government, the headquarters of the military of the dominant world superpower, a helicopter flight path for ferrying an open-ended number of VIPs around the city at the discretion of a broad array of inside-the-Beltway government agencies, and the busiest runway in the United States all within a five-mile radius. When an organization gets stuck in the rut of normalized deviance, extraordinary things must happen to shock it back out. It can be bold, charismatic new leadership. More often it is a dramatic, public catastrophe. These disasters can at times have a silver lining: an effective organization may newly find the will to patch not only the specific holes that allowed the disaster, but other holes it had been ignoring too. It can emerge even stronger than it was. Two questions then should confront the country as we reckon with the Reagan Airport crash and work to prevent the next “just a matter of time” air disaster. First: What can our air safety system do differently to patch these holes proactively? The answer must go beyond the oh-no-what-were-we-thinking window of opportunity for change that only briefly follows a disaster. It must mean understanding why air safety leaders ignored so many pilots warning of exactly this disaster — and figuring out how to change the incentives to make leaders actually seek those pilots out. And second: Does the air safety system bear the ultimate blame here? Or did the military, hurried members of Congress, government officials eager to please VIPs, the perplexing design ideas of the Dulles planners, and the public itself place so many competing demands on the airspace around the Potomac that disaster truly was just a matter of time? If the answer is yes, then the air safety system might just be an easy scapegoat for a broader rot, and we could be setting ourselves up for this to happen again. https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/dca-crash-waiting-to-happen-why-not-stop-it FAA Wants Permanent Helicopter Restrictions at Reagan Airport Federal air-safety officials want to permanently keep helicopters away from commercial jets taking off and landing at a busy Washington, D.C., airport after the deadliest U.S. aviation accident in more than two decades. The move, under consideration by senior Federal Aviation Administration officials, would be part of a long-term plan to improve safety at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, according to people familiar with the discussions. Helicopters have been temporarily barred from flying in a corridor used by the U.S. Army Black Hawk that collided on Jan. 29 with an American Airlines regional jet, killing 67 people. The chopper routes have been used to ferry senior military officials around the region and to train for a “continuity of government” mission in the event American political leaders need rapid evacuation from Washington. Other government agencies have also used the routes. Federal officials have said they would revisit the helicopter restrictions once the National Transportation Safety Board issues a preliminary report on the accident in the coming weeks. Preliminary indications from the probe point to multiple factors potentially contributing to the crash, including the design of the airspace, as well as actions by the helicopter pilot and air-traffic controller, according to people familiar with the investigation. Delays at Reagan National Airport due to investigation The NTSB said it would examine how far apart planes and helicopters are supposed to be while flying in the airspace. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy has criticized the Pentagon’s operation of helicopters near the airport. “If we have generals who are flying in helicopters for convenience through this airspace, that’s unacceptable,” he said last week. “Get in a damn Suburban and drive. You don’t need to take a helicopter.” The Army said it would continue to comply with FAA requirements and restrictions to enhance flight safety. The service said it was reassessing its aircraft operations near the airport and that it gave priority to the safety of the public and military personnel. The current restrictions allow certain critical flights. Duffy also suggested certain military missions can be done at a different time of night. The Jan. 29 crash occurred around 9 p.m. Eastern time. Defense officials have assumed that the helicopter routes would be closed in the coming months amid several ongoing investigations, but have privately said that the routes should be reopened. Adjustments under consideration if routes are reopened include limiting hours for training and test missions. Reagan’s convenient location, a few miles from Capitol Hill, has made the nearly 84-year-old airport a favorite among politicians, business executives and tourists. Space is tight at the airport. Reagan’s longest runway, Runway 1, is the nation’s busiest, airport officials have said, and it has two smaller runways. Routes into and out of the airport are constrained by no-fly zones around sensitive government buildings. The FAA has said it is also reviewing airspace around airports aside from Reagan that also have high volumes of helicopter and airplane traffic. Discussions about Reagan airport have also focused on a small runway known as Runway 33, people familiar with the matter said. The American Airlines regional jet was attempting to land there when it collided with the Army helicopter. Some government and industry aviation officials believe that there isn’t a problem with planes using the runway if helicopters aren’t near the traffic lanes. Warning signs existed for years about risks facing commercial passengers, with planes sharing the skies closely with helicopters zipping up and down the Potomac River. The path the American Airlines regional jet took toward Runway 33 required it to turn toward the right and then bank left to line up for its landing. That route crosses over a lane for helicopters at a relatively low altitude. There have been at least 35 events involving conflicts between helicopters and flights into and out of the airport that have been flagged since the 1980s, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of anonymous reports to a system overseen by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In one instance, in July 2018, a helicopter and small plane came within roughly 580 feet of each other while the plane was approaching Runway 33. The helicopter pilot had to maneuver to avoid the plane and questioned the air-traffic controller about it after, according to an internal FAA report on the incident viewed by the Journal. Neither aircraft had received traffic advisories or safety alerts, the report said. The helicopter pilot reported the incident as a near midair collision. “I’m sorry for the confusion,” the controller told the helicopter pilot, according to an audio recording of air-traffic-control communications following the incident. Nearly two weeks after the deadly crash over the Potomac, the FAA has lifted some of the constraints put on Reagan airport in the wake of the accident. The FAA on Tuesday boosted the airport’s arrival rate from 26 to 28 aircraft an hour, after temporarily reducing it to ease the strain on controllers still dealing with the aftermath of the crash, according to an email viewed by the Journal and earlier reported by other news outlets. The current rate is still lower than the airport’s typical maximum of 32 arrivals an hour. Reagan’s two smaller runways, which had been closed due to search and recovery efforts, have been reopened. https://www.msn.com/en-us/travel/news/faa-wants-permanent-helicopter-restrictions-at-reagan-airport/ar-AA1yRqYr Honolulu To Seattle Hawaiian Airlines Takes Decisive Action With Emergency Landing After Engine Smoke Threat Hawaiian Airlines‘ Honolulu to Seattle flight made a decisive emergency landing after engine smoke was detected, ensuring passenger safety with swift action. On February 9, 2025, a mechanical issue disrupted Hawaiian Airlines (HA) operations when Flight 22, bound for Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, was forced to execute an emergency landing in Honolulu. Shortly after departing Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), smoke emerged from the aircraft’s left engine, triggering a rapid response from the flight crew and emergency services. Emergency U-Turn Back to Honolulu The Airbus A330-200 aircraft, registered as N375HA, began its journey at 1:49 pm local time, carrying approximately 300 passengers and crew members. Shortly after takeoff, smoke billowed from the port-side engine, prompting the flight crew to activate emergency protocols. Prioritizing passenger safety, the crew made the decision to return to Honolulu, ensuring a swift and secure resolution to the mechanical issue. The flight landed safely back at Daniel K. Inouye International Airport at 2:03 pm, following a short 29-minute flight duration. Emergency response teams were stationed on the runway to assist, but the aircraft’s landing was uneventful, with no injuries reported among passengers or crew members. Swift Contingency Measures by Hawaiian Airlines Following the incident, Hawaiian Airlines quickly implemented contingency plans to minimize disruption for travelers. A replacement aircraft was arranged, allowing the passengers to continue their journey to Seattle. The substitute flight departed Honolulu at 7:50 pm, arriving at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport in the early hours of February 10, shortly after 3 am. Meanwhile, the affected Airbus A330-200 was inspected and repaired at Hawaiian Airlines’ primary maintenance facility in Honolulu. Technical crews addressed the engine issue and cleared the aircraft for service, with its next scheduled flight departing for Sacramento the following afternoon. Potential Causes and Aviation Safety Protocols Aviation experts speculate that engine smoke, such as the kind detected during this incident, may stem from oil leaks, overheating components, or other mechanical malfunctions. Situations like these trigger mandatory safety protocols, which often involve immediate inspection and emergency landings to prevent potential escalation. The swift response by Hawaiian Airlines underscores the importance of adhering to rigorous safety standards. The airline emphasized its commitment to passenger safety in an official statement, acknowledging the inconvenience caused by the incident while highlighting the seamless execution of emergency procedures. Context: Similar Aviation Incidents Emergency landings due to mechanical issues are not uncommon in the aviation industry, as illustrated by a similar incident involving United Airlines in December 2023. United Airlines Flight UA551, traveling from Newark to Denver, was forced to divert to Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport after experiencing a mechanical failure in its right engine. The emergency landing occurred on December 14, 2023, with 199 passengers and crew members aboard. Emergency crews extinguished flames emanating from the engine after the aircraft landed safely. Passengers aboard United Flight UA551 described the harrowing experience, with one traveler recalling flames and smoke visible from his window. Flight attendants instructed passengers to remain seated as the situation unfolded, adding to the tension. Despite the alarming nature of the event, no injuries were reported, and the airline acknowledged the issue in an official statement. Hawaiian Airlines’ Commitment to Safety The February 2025 incident involving Hawaiian Airlines Flight 22 serves as a reminder of the aviation industry’s focus on passenger safety. Hawaiian Airlines’ ability to quickly mobilize resources, provide a replacement aircraft, and conduct thorough inspections demonstrates the airline’s dedication to maintaining high safety standards. As the Airbus A330-200 resumes its regular schedule following repairs, Hawaiian Airlines reassures passengers of its commitment to proactive maintenance and reliable operations. By responding promptly and professionally, the airline minimized disruptions and maintained customer confidence, further solidifying its reputation as one of Hawaii’s leading carriers. Broader Implications for Aviation The incident also highlights the importance of emergency training for flight crews and airport personnel. Events like these test the readiness of airlines and airports to respond effectively, ensuring the safety and well-being of passengers and crew members alike. As air travel continues to grow, incidents like the one involving Flight 22 underline the significance of robust maintenance practices, continuous training, and adherence to global aviation standards. Both Hawaiian Airlines and the wider aviation industry will undoubtedly continue to prioritize safety and reliability as key pillars of their operations. https://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/honolulu-to-seattle-hawaiian-airlines-takes-decisive-action-with-emergency-landing-after-engine-smoke-threat/ FAA's Staffing Troubles Make Flying More Dangerous, Controllers Say Staffing shortages at air traffic control facilities have a negative impact on public safety and have made conditions more dangerous for years, two air traffic controllers told Newsweek in the aftermath of the deadliest U.S. aviation disaster in decades. The Federal Aviation Administration employees, who requested anonymity because they are forbidden to speak to reporters, said low staffing levels in the high-pressure job equate to long hours, widespread mandatory overtime and high rates of turnover within the federal agency responsible for protecting the nation's busy skies. FAA officials did not respond to a question on the controllers' allegations that staffing shortages have a detrimental impact on safety and operations. FAA’s Staffing Woes Contribute to ‘Dangerous’ Flying Staffing shortages at the Federal Aviation Administration have created "dangerous" conditions for years, one air traffic controller told Newsweek. Photo-illustration by Newsweek/Getty "The air traffic system, especially in reference to staffing, is absolutely critical," one veteran controller told Newsweek. "It's been dangerous for years." One controller, with nearly 10 years of FAA experience, said it's unclear if insufficient staffing factored into the January 29 collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and an Army helicopter, killing 67 people in the deadliest U.S. aviation disaster since 2001. But it wasn't wholly surprising to many aviation experts, he said. "We've all seen s**t that's f***ing crazy, that nobody hears about, right? The unfortunate reality is that we have been saying for years, it's going to take a fatality with an air carrier to get people's attention," he said. Air Traffic Control: 'Low Pay', 'Brutal Schedules' The controller said the FAA's workforce suffered from relatively low pay within the aviation industry compared to pilots and brutal schedules, especially for employees with children. "It used to be an air traffic controller made more than a first officer, but just a little less than a captain," he said. "Kids who are going to college are choosing the pilot route instead of the controller route because the pilot route has a better quality of life and it pays way more." President Donald Trump said FAA diversity requirements could be to blame following the Potomac River crash. One controller said the diversity requirement did affect hiring and excluded some qualified candidates—including military veterans—although the training was the same for everyone and nobody who was working was unqualified to do so. A second controller said he believed hires on diversity grounds had not significantly impacted operations but could have had an effect on staffing numbers. DC plane crash A large section of American Airlines Flight 5342 is removed from the Potomac River on February 3 amid recovery efforts following a midair collision with an Army helicopter on January 29, killing 67 people. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images Air traffic controllers earned a median annual salary of $137,380 in May 2023, compared to $219,140 for airline pilots, copilots and flight engineers, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Air traffic control specialists earn a median annual wage of $127,805, with pay increases for completion of additional training, according to the FAA's website. "The annual salary for more advanced controllers who have completed on-the-job training varies with the location of the facility and the complexity of the airspace," the site explains, adding that additional factors include experienced candidates who were directly hired by facilities. Pay varies widely between states, with those in New Hampshire making an average $163,480 compared to $75,950 for Arkansas. Former FAA administrator Mike Whitaker, who resigned in late January, said during his confirmation hearing in October 2023 that more competitive compensation was needed to address the shortage of air traffic controllers but little has changed since, the controller said. Air traffic controllers help safeguard more than 45,000 flights and 2.9 million airline passengers nationwide per day. Most air traffic control specialists work full-time, with some putting in additional shifts, including on weekends and holidays. But they can retire at age 50 following 20 years of service—unlike most other federal employees who must work 30 years before retiring— and enjoy larger annuities than their counterparts, according to the FAA. The agency announced in September that it had hired more than 1,800 air traffic controllers in 2024, bringing the nationwide tally to more than 14,000, including roughly 3,400 in various training stages. But the number of certified professional controllers stands at 10,800, several thousand short of the current target of 14,600 as set by the FAA and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, a union that represents the federal employees. Staffing targets for certified professional controllers at airport towers and terminal approaches had only been 72 percent met as of September 2023, FAA figures show. Ronald Reagan National Airport, near the site of the disaster, had met only 63 percent of its staffing target. DC plane crash The impact of the staffing shortage on safety is "definitely detrimental," one controller told Newsweek, adding the January 29 crash could serve as a "wakeup call" to spark change. Win McNamee/Getty Images FAA officials said reversing the decades-long decline of air traffic controllers is a top priority. "We continue to hire and onboard new controllers. Their work is critical to meeting our safety mission," the agency told Newsweek in a statement. Candidates get up to four months of training in Oklahoma City. Then on-the-job training begins, lasting up to four years and with some failing to make it through. Each location has unique factors including weather patterns, traffic volume and geographic features that trainees must master before becoming certified. A mandatory retirement age of 56 meant more stress on those still in the system, one controller said. That meant the FAA handing out overtime like water or candy because the alternative was to reduce flights, the controller said. Controllers at virtually all larger FAA sites, including Air Route Traffic Control Centers and Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities, have six-day work weeks based on actual facility staffing levels compared to volume and complexity, the controller said. Newsweek was not independently able to confirm the figures. The impact of the shortage on safety is "definitely detrimental," the controller said. Prior to the disaster in Washington, D.C., the deadliest U.S. aviation accident in two decades occurred on November 12, 2001, when American Airlines Flight 587 crashed into a neighborhood in Belle Harbor, New York, killing 260 people. The deadliest plane accident in U.S. history took place on May 12, 1979, when American Airlines Flight 191 crashed during takeoff at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, killing 273 people. "The fact there has only been one major accident in the last 20 years shows how rugged, stress-tested and safe the U.S. is," the controller said. "But it's definitely teetering on the edge of disaster." https://www.newsweek.com/faa-staffing-shortage-safety-concern-air-traffic-controllers-2027880 Bering Air crash investigation prompts questions surrounding aviation technology in Alaska ANCHORAGE, Alaska (KTUU) - Questions have been raised regarding aviation technology available to Alaskan pilots as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) begins its investigation into last week’s fatal Bering Air crash outside of Nome, killing all 10 people on board. Bush planes flown by pilots in rural areas use visual flight rules (VFR). This means pilots operate aircraft visually without relying on instruments. Instead, pilots use visual clues and depend on clear weather conditions. VFR is generally reliable, Dillingham Pilot Scott Garrett explained, unless the weather takes a turn for the worst. “Weather systems just move rapidly,” he said. “You can take off when the weather is really nice, and then get caught in terrible weather within half an hour.” During an NTSB press conference regarding the Bering Air crash investigation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Chris Rocheleau responded to concerns surrounding Alaska pilots relying on VFR. He said the FAA will be working with state agencies to reevaluate VFR regulations, as well as changing infrastructure within the Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative. The wreckage from the crash has been collected and sent back to Nome. It is being sorted as the NTSB determines what pieces need to be sent out for further testing. https://www.alaskasnewssource.com/2025/02/12/bering-air-crash-investigation-prompts-questions-surrounding-aviation-technology-alaska/ Unprecedented gear failure suspected in Arizona jet crash tragedy Ladd Sanger, an aviation attorney and jet pilot, weighed in on what might have happened to cause the crash. AUSTIN, Texas — The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating a deadly jet crash in Arizona on Monday. The jet made a stop in Austin before crashing on a landing at Scottsdale Airport in Arizona. The Learjet 35 was owned by musician Vince Neil, who was not on it at the time. Video at the Scottsdale Airport shows the plane trying to land on Monday. The landing gear seemed to fail, and the jet crashed into another plane. One person was killed in the crash, while two people suffered critical injuries. Another person was taken to the hospital. Ladd Sanger is an aviation attorney and jet pilot. “Relatively unique event, and I am not aware of any Lear 35 suffering a complete main landing gear failure like this when it was down and locked," said Sanger. "It will be interesting to look at the mechanics to see what caused the gear to collapse." Sanger said the jet was coming from South Florida, made a stop Austin and then went on to attempt a landing in Arizona. The NTSB will lead the investigation. “Look at the system and analyze them. If there are things like metal fatigue or materials analysis, those parts will be shipped to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, D.C.,” said Sanger. The cockpit voice recorder will also be sent to Washington to be analyzed. Neil is the lead singer of the band Mötley Crüe, who issued a statement through Neil's representative. It reads in part: "Mr. Neil was not on the plane. This a rapidly evolving situation and there is an ongoing investigation." Sanger said the complete investigation by the NTSB could take up to two years. https://www.kvue.com/article/news/nation-world/scottsdale-plane-crash-aviation-expert/269-61062194-79e3-46f1-a66c-e39f4842ef8d Spirit Airlines restructuring update: Frontier’s proposal rejected Spirit Airlines has provided an update on its restructuring process following a proposal from Frontier Group Holdings, the parent company of Frontier Airlines. On February 4, 2025, Frontier submitted a new restructuring proposal offering Spirit stakeholders US$400 million in second-lien debt and 19% of Frontier's common equity following a proposed merger. The proposal would eliminate Spirit's need for a previously announced US$350 million equity rights offering but required waiving a US$35 million termination fee. However, Spirit identified significant concerns, including that the proposal would deliver less value to its stakeholders than its existing restructuring plan, create delays, increase costs, and face regulatory and court approval uncertainties. In line with its restructuring agreements, Spirit shared the offer with advisors for its senior secured and convertible noteholders. On February 6, the company entered into confidentiality agreements with key stakeholders, allowing them to review the proposal in detail. On February 7, Spirit countered with a proposal maintaining Frontier's stated valuation but incorporating market-based mechanisms to determine Spirit stakeholders' equity in the combined company. Unlike Frontier's proposal, Spirit's counterproposal required Frontier to pay the US$35 million termination fee. Frontier rejected Spirit's counterproposal on February 10, and reiterated its initial offer. Spirit remains committed to advancing its restructuring plan, which aims to significantly reduce its debt and position the company for long-term success. A confirmation hearing for Spirit's reorganisation plan is scheduled for February 13, 2025. Approximately 99.99% of voting creditors have accepted the plan, with nearly all objections resolved. Spirit expects to complete the restructuring within the first quarter of 2025, ensuring a more stable financial future. https://avitrader.com/2025/02/12/spirit-airlines-restructuring-update-frontiers-proposal-rejected/ Boeing says it delivered 45 aircraft in busiest January since 2023 • In its first full month of production since strike, Boeing delivers 40 737 MAX jets • Gross orders drop for Boeing to 36, down from 142 in December • Feb 11 - Boeing said on Tuesday that it had delivered 45 airplanes in January, up from 30 deliveries the previous month and the most deliveries in a month for the U.S. planemaker since 2023. The deliveries included 40 737 MAX aircraft, up from 25 delivered in the same month a year ago, when a mid-air blowout on a nearly new Alaska Air 737 MAX 9 grounded the model and brought Boeing under scrutiny from federal regulators. It was Boeing's busiest January for deliveries since 2019. It was also the company's first full month of production since a seven-week strike last fall halted most of its commercial airplane production. Aircraft deliveries are closely watched by Wall Street because planemakers collect the majority of their payment when they hand over jets to customers. It delivered seven 737 MAX jets to United Airlines, five to Southwest Airlines and seven to unidentified Chinese airlines, according to the company. According to Cirium Fleet Analyzer and flight records on FlightRadar24, Boeing delivered 737 MAX aircraft to Shenzhen Airlines, 9 Air, Shandong Airlines, China Eastern Airlines, Xiamen Airlines, and two to Air China. Boeing also delivered four 787s, including the first 787 to TAAG Angola, and one 777 freighter to Ethiopian Airlines. Boeing booked 34 orders for 737 MAX to unidentified customers and two 777 freighter orders, also to unidentified customers, for a total of 36 new orders, up from 27 orders during the same month a year ago. It did not record any cancellations. After adjusting for accounting standards, Boeing added 42 orders to its contracted backlog: 33 737 MAX jets, two 777 freighters and seven 787s. That is down from 142 gross orders in December, including 30 787 orders for flydubai and 100 737 MAX orders from Turkey's Pegasus Airlines, a longtime Airbus customer. As Boeing works to stabilize commercial jetliner production in the United States, a Boeing executive told Reuters on Monday that there is not enough demand in India to justify opening a final assembly line in the country. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-says-it-delivered-45-aircraft-busiest-january-since-2023-2025-02-11/ ‘New’ F-35 Assembled from Two Wrecked Jets Makes Its First Flight The Air Force’s first-ever effort to stitch two damaged F-35s into a single stealth fighter is nearing its final stages, with successful functional check flights now complete. Dubbed the “Franken-bird,” the aircraft made its inaugural flight Jan. 16, a spokesperson for the 388th Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, told Air & Space Forces Magazine. The fighter is now at Lockheed Martin’s assembly plant at Fort Worth, Texas, for additional tests before it returns to combat status. There, the aircraft will also undergo final work on the section just behind its nose, which currently has only anti-corrosion primer, to apply low-observable materials. “According to Lockheed Martin estimates, the aircraft is expected to be completed within an eight-week timeframe, with a projected return date of late March at the earliest,” the spokesperson said. Once the jet receives its final certifications, it will return to Hill and be operated by the 4th Fighter Squadron. The project is estimated to have cost less than $6 million, a fraction of the typical $80 million for a brand-new F-35A. Dave Myers, lead engineer at the F-35 Joint Program Office, explained in a release that by combining the best parts of both aircraft, the result will be a fully capable jet with no loss in performance. The “new” fighter, designated as tail number -5269, was created from the wrecks of two earlier F-35s: AF-27, which suffered a severe engine fire in 2014 at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. AF-211, which survived a landing gear collapse in 2020 at Hill “When we received the aircraft, it was pretty much a shell,” Senior Airman Jaguar Arnold, the aircraft’s dedicated crew chief, said in a release. “There were a lot of tasks to complete that we hadn’t done before at the unit level.” The “Franken-bird” team included the F-35 JPO, Airmen and civilians from the 388th Fighter Wing and Ogden Air Logistics Complex, and Lockheed Martin technicians. The team created custom tools and equipment to join the aircraft sections at Ogden before the jet returned to Hill in November 2023. Since then, maintainers have worked on the final restoration stages. Merging the two wrecked planes involved a list of first-time tasks that hadn’t been tackled before. The work included reinstalling landing gear, rewiring the aircraft, rebuilding the cockpit and avionics, and installing a variety of components. The team also procured and installed “belly bands” between and just forward of the air intakes. These bands, made of composite material, provide extra structural support, and reinforced the aircraft’s body after the new nose was installed. The groundwork for the project was laid back in January 2020, when the JPO turned to Lockheed Martin for insights on repairing F-22s. At that point, the JPO had already started salvaging damaged F-35 components, improving maintenance, and getting creative with parts, including turning the AF-27 into a trainer jet for Aircraft Deployed Battle Repair. “When we took responsibility for this project, we were taking on something unprecedented at the field level and it wasn’t easy,” said 1st Lt. Ryan Bare, Sortie Generation Flight commander for the 4th Fighter Generation Squadron. “But we were also taking on an opportunity for our maintainers to gain proficiency in this type of work and build experience at the unit level. As a program, and as a unit, we’ve benefited greatly from this.” The JPO has collected Insights and feedback from the process to update data and procedures for all F-35 maintainers. The service also anticipates this project paving the way for future reclamation tasks with the equipment, techniques, and expertise developed throughout the effort. Airmen from the 388th Fighter Wing completed a lengthy project to restore a single F-35A Lightning II from two separate, damaged aircraft, and begin its return to combat status. The project was an interagency effort between the F-35 Joint Program Office, Ogden Air Logistics Complex, 388th Fighter Wing and Lockheed Martin. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/new-f-35-assembled-two-wrecked-jets-first-flight/ CALENDAR OF EVENTS • · Sponsor the 2025 Fuzion Safety Conference! March 4 & 5, 2025 (Orlando) • · "Automation in Transportation: Lessons for Safe Implementation," on March 11-12, 2025, in Washington, DC. • · Annual Women in Aviation International Conference, Gaylord Rockies Resort & Conference Center | Denver Colorado, March 27-29, 2025 • · 59th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium is scheduled March 31 - April 2, 2025 • · Air Charter Safety Foundation (ACSF) Safety Symposium April 7-9, 2025 • · AIA Conference: The Aviation Insurance Association's annual conference in Orlando, Florida from April 25–28, 2025 • · Sixth Edition of International Accident Investigation Forum, 21 to 23 May 2025, Singapore • Flight Safety Foundation - Aviation Safety Forum June 5-6, 2025 - Brussels • · The 9th Shanghai International Aerospace Technology and Equipment Exposition 2025; June 11 to 13, 2025 • ISASI ANNUAL SEMINAR 2025'September 29, 2025 – October 3, 2025, DENVER, COLORADO • CHC Safety & Quality Summit, 11th – 13th November 2025, Vancouver, BC Canada Curt Lewis